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The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECIjAC) executed a project to promote a dialogue on trade 
liberalization in the Western Hemisphere. The project organized 
several colloquia and conferences, which included the participation 
of government officials, entrepreneurs, academics, and other 
experts. The themes discussed were developed in analytical working 
papers covering a wide array of subjects related to hemispheric 
trade liberalization. 
This final report describes the activities undertaken by the 
project and is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the 
execution of the project. Section 2 provides a description of the 
colloquia and conferences and the working papers. Appearing at the 
end of the report. Section 3 presents appendices which outline in 
sharper detail the activities of the project. 
1 Organization 
1.1 Executing Agency 
The project was executed by ECLAC, through its Washington 
office. This office was responsible for hiring the consultants, the 
organization of the colloquia and conferences, and the 
dissemination activities. The director of ECLACs office in 
Washington served as the project coordinator. 
1.2 Steering Committee 
* 
The Steering Committee, consisting of the President of the 
IDB, Enrique V. Iglesias and the Executive Secretary of ECLAC, Gert 
Rosenthal, or their designated representatives, Nohra Rey de 
Marulanda and Isaac Cohen, provided overall guidance for the 
activities carried out within the framework of the project. The 
committee was responsible for establishing the lines of action, 
approving the work program, and ensuring operational, 
administrative, and technical coordination between the two 
institutions. The Committee met several times formally and 
informally throughout the duration of the project. The summaries of 
formal meetings appear in Appendix 1. 
1.3 Advisory Committee 
The Advisory Committee made recommendations on the work 
program and agenda. The committee consisted of five members, well 
known for their expertise in the field of international trade: 
Mr. William Cline, Senior Fellow, Institute for 
International Economics; 
Ms. Louise Fréchette, Assistant Deputy Minister, External 
Affairs, Canada; 
Mr. Jorge Gallardo, Consultant and Entrepreneur, Ecuador; 
Mr. M. Alister Mclntyre, Vice-Chancellor, The University of the West Indies and Former Deputy Secretary-General of 
UNCTAD; 
Mr. Rubens Ricupero, Ambassador of Brazil to the United 
States. 
Ms. Sylvia Ostry, Chairman of the Centre for International 
Studies, University of Toronto replaced Ms. Fréchette after the 
latter was appointed Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations. 
The Advisory Committee held seven meetings with one informal 
discussion luncheon. Appendix 1, in addition to the the summaries 
of the formal Steering Committee meetings, also includes the 
summaries of the meetings. 
1.4 Liaison Committee 
To maintain effective links with the countries of the region, 
each member country of the IDB was asked to appoint a person to act 
as liaison with the program. Liaison persons were responsible for 
channelling the results of the activities to the various public and 
private sector agencies in their countries and for bringing to the 






The colloquia brought together experts which included 
entrepreneurs, academicians, and government officials from North, 
South and Central America, the Caribbean, Japan, and Europe to 
consider the basic trade policy and technical issues implicit in 
hemispheric trade liberalization. Of the seven colloquia, five were 
held in Washington, D.C., one in Toronto, Canada and another in 
Sao Paulo, Brazil. 
1st Colloquium: ( February 23-24, 1992 ) discussed the 
project's goals with the Project Liaison Committee. 
2nd Colloquium: ( April 3 0 - May 1, 1992 ) addressed the 
implications of hemispheric trade policy for the 
multilateral trading system, and for relations with the 
rest of the world, particularly Europe and Japan. 
3rd Colloquium: ( May 31 - June 2, 1992; Toronto, Canada ) 
discussed the wide range of trade liberalization efforts 
already underway in the hemisphere, namely, CARICOM, CACM, 
Andean Pact, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA, and their relation to a 
Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area. 
4th Colloquium: ( July 27-28, 1992 ) analyzed costs and 
benefits by country. The discussion emphasized the 
relevance of economic size, level of economic 
development, proximity to the North American market, and 
"macroeconomic readiness". 
5th Colloquium: ( September 28-29, 1992) highlighted potential 
negotiation issues, with an emphasis on safeguards and 
unilateral trade remedy actions, rules of origin, market 
access, environment and labor. 
6th Colloquium: ( December 1-2, 1992 ) focused on how 
hemispheric trade liberalization could be brought about, 
emphasizing the role of domestic policies in 
facilitating the transition. 
7th Colloquitim: ( April 19-20, 1993; Sao Paulo, Brazil ) 
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stimulated dialogue with Brazilian entrepreneurs on Brazil's 
integration into a hemispheric free trade arrangement. 
2.2 Conferences 
The conferences complemented the colloquia expanding on the 
issues raised earlier with a wider group of participants. 
First Conference: ( May 24-25, 1993; Santiago, Chile ) 
considered trade liberalization arrangements, cost-
benefit analyses at country and sector level, the 
negotiating agenda, and the transition. 
Second Conference: ( November 1-2, 1993 ) assessed conditions 
and policies for maximizing the gains of a hemispheric 
free trade area and reviewed estimates of two CGE models 
on a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area. 
The list of participants, colloquia and conference summaries, 
and agendas are included in Appendix 2. 
2.3 Participants 
Four hundred and nine participants from forty one countries, 
from public and private sectors, research and advocacy 
institutions, international organizations, and the press, 
participated in the activities of the project. The diagram on the 
next page shows the distribution of the participants according to 
their affiliation by sector. The public sector included trade 
officials and other experts, who were not members of the liaison 
committee; regional and advocacy organizations included 
academicians, researchers, and not-for-profit advocates; private 
includes experts from the private sector, notably multinational 
corporations, export/import businesses, law and consulting firms 
involved in international trade. 
Affiliation of Participants by Sector 
Conferences and Colloquia 
Research & Advoc. 
32% 
Govt. Rep. 
17% Public 17% 
2.4 Working Papers 
The Project produced seventy working papers. Sixty were 
coitiinissioned to public and private sector experts from Latin 
America, the United States, Canada, Europe, and Japan. Ten were 
written by ECLAC staff. Appendix 3 includes the list of titles and 
authors of the working papers. 
Approximately 24,000 copies of the working papers were 
distributed. Documents were made available at the six colloquia 
and the two conferences. Also, they were distributed through the 
Washington, D.C. ECLAC office. The working papers were listed in 
the newsletters of CEPAL-Washington CEPAL News. IDE's Economic and 
Social Development Newsletter, Development Policv. and the Council 
of Americas' newsletter, Washington Report. 
The figure below shows a breakdown of the distribution of 
working papers by sector. 
Distribution of Working Papers 
by Sector 




Flutes based on an estimated total disHibution ol 24,050 papers 
2.5 Publication 
The final activity of the project is the publication of an 
edited volume of twenty project working papers. The volume is to be 
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Minutes of the First Steering Committee Meeting 
IDB-ECLAC Project 
Santiago, Chile June 21, 1991 
1. Date and venue; The first steering committee meeting of the 
IDB-ECLAC Project was held at ECLAC headquarters on June 21, 1991. 
The meeting was held after a ceremony to inaugurate the project. 
2. Participants; The Inter-American Bank was represented by 
Enrique Iglesias, President of the Bank, and Nohra rey de 
Marulanda, Manager of Economic and Social Development. On behalf of 
ECLAC, Gert Rosenthal, Executive Secretary, and Isaac Cohen, 
Director of the Washington Office, attended the meeting. 
3. Steering Committee Responsibilities: The President of the IDB 
and the Executive Secretary of ECLAC designated Nohra Rey de 
Marulanda and Isaac Cohen as their respective representatives in 
the daily execution of the Project. Moreover, there was an 
agreement by the President and the Executive Secretary to meet 
biannually, while their representatives would meet when necessary, 
or at least monthly. 
4. Advisory Coinmittee; The Steering Committee entrusted Ms. 
Marulanda to consult with the Executive Directors of the IDB with 
reference to the designation of possible members of the Advisory 
Committee. In principle, the Committee decided on the following 
individuals: S. Weintraub (USA); S. Ostry (Canada); R. Ricupero 
(Brazil); A. Mclntyre (Jamaica); J. Gallardo (Ecuador). 
5. Issues with reference to government participation; The 
Committee entrusted Ms. Marulanda with drafting a letter, to be 
sent to the Governors of the Bank, to designate a representatives 
that would serve as a liaison with the Project. This letter should 
be signed by the titular heads of the Committee. 
6. Project Personnel: The Committee instructed the Coordinator to 
hire personnel to assist in the Project's execution as soon as 
possible. The Coordinator is to propose candidates for the three 
positions to this Committee. 
7. Consultants: With reference to the fees that will be paid to 
consultants drafting working papers, the Committee has set as a 
ceiling the amount of US 10,000. At least 60 jiapers have been 
planned for the Project. The Committee further decided that 
institutions and/or organizations will not contracted to produce 
papers. 
8. Colloquia: The Committee considered the possibility that 
colloquia be held not only in Washington, but also in other venues. 
The possibility of holding colloquia in, respectively, Canada, 
Central America, the Caribbean, Brazil, and Santiago will be 
considered. 
9. Conferences; With respect to the two planned conferences, the 
Committee decided that one will be held in Washington and the other 
in Santiago, both to be scheduled near the end of the 18 month 
period designated for the execution of the Project. 
10. Venue of next Steering Committee meeting; Finally, the 
Committee decided that the next meeting of the titular members will 
be held in Washington on a date convenient to all members. 
SUMMARY OF THE MEETING OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE 
OF THE IDP/ECLAC PROJECT OM HEMISPHERIC TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION (ATN-SF-3723-RE) 
FEBRUARY 11, 1993 
1. IDE President Enrique Iglesias and ECLAC Executive Secretary 
Gert Rosenthal met at the Bank's headquarters on 11 February 1993. 
Also present were Norah Rey de Marulanda, Manager DES, and Daniel 
Szabo, Senior Advisor/DES, from the IDE, as well as the Project 
Coordinator Isaac Cohen, from ECLAC Washington. 
2. The Steering Committee reviewed the project's satisfactory 
development to this date and examined the forthcoming activities 
that will be carried out before the project's completion 
anticipated for June 1993. 
3. Concerning the possibility of organizing a seventh colloquium in 
Brazil, the Steering Committee authorized the initiation of 
consultations with the Brazilian authorities for the purpose of 
exploring dates and logistics. 
4. Regarding the celebration of the two conferences which will 
culminate the project's activities, the Steering Committee decided 
to hold the first at ECLAC headquarters, in Santiago Chile, on 28-
29 May and the second at IDB headquarters, in Washington, on 24-25 
June. 
5. The Steering Committee decided that it was convenient to 
initiate the final evaluation of the project before its completion. 
With this purpose, the project Coordinator was asked to submit to 
the Bank the names of two experts, a Latin American and a North 
American, to carry out the evaluation together. 
6. It was decided that it would be useful to hold two more meetings 
of the Advisory Committee, one in Brazil during the seventh 
colloquium, and the other in Washington before or in t?etween the 
two conferences. ' 

roB/ECLAC PROJECT ATN-SF-3723-RE 
Support to the Process of Hemispheric 
Trade Liberalization 
Summary of the First Meeting of the Advisory Committee 
Washington, D.C. 
November 25, 1991 
The discussion focused on the various elements of the work 
program including project objectives, overall strategy, proposed 
topics, the colloquia, and potential consultants. 
PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
Fundamentally, the purpose of the project is to inform 
governments of the region of the main issues involved in a Western 
Hemisphere Free Trade Area (WHFTA) so that they may be able to make 
their own decisions regarding their participation and means to 
proceed. Rather than a purely intellectual exercise, the project 
is designed to address concrete and practical concerns; to provide 
instruments to the governments to assist them in reaching their own 
conclusions. 
PROJECT STRATEGY AND SCOPE 
Suggestions regarding the focus of the project followed from 
the overall objectives. It was recognized, particularly in light 
of the heterogeneity of the region, that broad issues of common 
interest among the countries need to be addressed. 
The issues suggested include: 
(1) definition of a WHFTA (what specifically does it entail? 
What can the countries anticipate?); 
(2) global and macroeconomic considerations (e.g.^ WHFTA in 
the context of salient current global dynamics); 
(3) rationale for a WHFTA (What can be gained? What are the 
stakes?); 
(4) concrete measures regarding how to proceed towards 
implementation of a WHFTA (what are the countries' 
options? How can the transition period be best managed?); 
(5) reconciliation between WHFTA and existing subregional 
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integration schemes (how will these schemes be affected? 
How can they serve as an intermediary step towards the 
establishment of a WHFTA?); and (6) domestic constraints 
from a WHFTA (What are the considerations and 
implications of a WHFTA on domestic issues? What 
complementary policies are necessary?). 
In light of these common interest issues, suggestions were 
made to revise the initially proposed four main topic headings. 
Most of the emphasis was focused on revising the first main 
heading: costs and benefits of a WHFTA. This included suggestions 
to invert the order of subcategories (country studies first, then 
region, then global considerations), to reducing its scope (perhaps 
eliminate the "sectoral and further disaggregation"), and to 
include some global and macroeconomic issues not currently 
addressed. 
Other observations regarding the main topic headings: 
(1) the proposed four headings are not equally weighted 
(costs and benefits and contents of WHFTA appear to take 
lionshare of issues and importance); 
(2) regarding the second heading, contents of WHFTA: while 
the subcategories are clear, how these topics will be 
addressed is not; 
(3) efforts should be made to anticipate the priority 
negotiating issues in the contents heading (i.e., not 
only issues of today, but also anticipated areas of 
growing interest in the future); and 
(4) a separate main heading was suggested: "alternatives for 
the transition." 
It was observed that the work program as it currently stands 
may be too ambitious, and, similarly, that there may exist too much 
diffusion of effort. Perhaps fewer papers, more strategically 
focused may better serve the project. Suggestions^ from the 
advisors regarding possible consultants for the project will be 
sent to ECLAC/Washington. 
It was also observed that the project as presented 
incorporated a bias from which can be drawn the conclusion that the 
establishment of a WHFTA is a priori a positive development. There 
was hence a suggestion that efforts be made to ensure that the 
dialogue be balanced, open, and critical. This would include 
incorporating, for example, different perspectives from different 
regions of the hemisphere. It was acknowledged that while the 
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project is subject to certain institutional constraints, objectives 
are defined by the existing plan of operations approved by the 
Bank's member governments, there was room to cover the spectrum of 
perspectives within the existing framework of the project. 
PROJECT COLLOQÜIA 
There was some discussion about the agenda for the six 
colloquia. It was proposed that each of the main topic headings 
coincide with a colloquium. In addition, it was suggested that one 
colloquium will be held in Canada and provide Canadian 
perspective(s) on a WHFTA. The purpose of the first colloquium in 
January with members of the Liaison Committee be twofold: 
(1) to provide the governments with a strategic overview of 
the project and hence the broad issues which pertain to 
the meaning of a WHFTA and the considerations regarding 
its implementation; and 
(2) to solicit ideas from members of the Liaison Committee 
regarding what they hope to receive from the project. 
PROJECT TOPICS 
Suggestions regarding subheadings and individual topics 
included: 
(1) Costs and benefits country case studies need to be 
carefully chosen. Several approaches were recommended. 
One, choose the countries according to typology (e.g., by 
degree of openness, and/or by trade concentration with 
U.S.). Second, develop a manual (highlighting common 
cost and benefit considerations) that can be applied to 
all countries. Third, develop a country-specific trade 
model for the region to estimate costs and benefits from 
trade liberalization (perhaps differentiating by several 
types of countries, and analyzing by sector); 
(2) The financial side of trade needs to be included; 
(3) Environmental issues as they relate to trade should be 
emphasized; 
(4) Labor adjustment issues, particularly important from U.S. 
perspective, are very important; 
(5) NTBs and dispute settlement should be a priority in the 
contents of WHFTA, tariff reductions less so. 
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(6) Costs and benefits analyses need to go beyond trade 
flows, focusing on investment flows as a result of a 
WHFTA as well. 
The meeting, in sum, served several constructive purposes: (1) 
to elucidate the project objectives; (2) to help better focus the 
project strategy, in large part by addressing areas of common 
interest regarding a WHFTA; and (3) to help prioritize the 
individual topic areas. 
IDB/ECLAC Project 
Support to the Process of Hemispheric Trade Liberalization 
Summary of the Second Meeting of the Advisory Committee 
Washington, D.C. 
February 6, 1992 
The meeting began with a review by ECLAC of the proceedings 
of the first colloquium of the project, and a summary of the IDB-
ECLAC overview of the issues document. The advisors followed with 
their reactions. 
ECLAC Review 
Much of what was verbally summarized of the first colloquium 
can be found in print in the summary handed out to the advisors 
at the meeting, and will not be repeated here. In general, the 
project was well-received by the "liaison committee." The 
attendance was impressive, as was the quality of participants and 
their interest in the project. They expressed a need for 
assistance in helping their governments to make critical 
decisions as regards participation in hemispheric trade 
liberalization proposals. The project should serve as a vehicle 
to promote a dialogue on the issues, and as a means to build 
intellectual capital. 
The representatives expressed broad coincidence of interest 
with the proposed IDB-ECLAC agenda as regards the issues to be 
studied. This included an interest in learning lessons from the 
GATT, an emphasis on cost-benefit analyses (at the sectoral as 
well as country and regional level), an emphasis on the technical 
aspects of the anticipated negotiations agenda, and a focus on 
the sub-regional integration systems. 
A brief review by ECLAC of the most recent version of the 
IDB-ECLAC overview of the issues document followed. Revisions 
have been made to reflect suggestions both from the advisors and 
from the liaison committee. Some logistics of the project were 
also addressed. In particular, the project has been extended for 
six months to facilitate the designation of a theme for each of 
the five colloquia. The themes are to correspond to the five main 
topic headings as outlined in the IDB-ECLAC document. 
Reaction from Advisors 
(1) The project is on the right track. Progress has been 
made in the presentation of the issues as evidenced in the IDB-
ECLAC document which reflects suggestions made in the last 
advisory committee. 
(2) There is a need for flexibility in the project in light 
of changing global events. Witness how events at the GATT have 
changed since the last meeting. Changes in the U.S. political 
climate need to be taken into consideration. 
(3) The papers presented by the consultants of the project 
need to be practical, non-academic, and integrated. 
(4) Some of the topics as presented in the IDB-ECLAC 
document are more balanced than others. Some which are presented 
largely from a northern perspective are found in the negotiation 
agenda (IV), and include the topics of TRIMS, TRIPS, environment, 
and labor. In these areas in particular, there is a need to 
better reflect certain complexities (including the interaction of 
topics) and nuances (including a balanced view). 
(5) Cost benefit analysis should be the centerpiece of the 
project; the spinal column. As presented in current document, it 
is not. Perhaps as much as one-third of the resources from the 
project should be devoted to developing an empirical model 
(perhaps similar to the EC's Cecchini Report). ECLAC Santiago 
might coordinate this effort. 
(6) The project should take up the offer made by Switzerland 
in the first colloquium for technical assistance. 
(7) The colloquia should not be viewed as the major events 
of the project. The most important end result will be final body 
of research. 
(8) The advisory committee should see a list of the topics 
as well as possibly the consultants who are to produce the papers 
soon if it is to provide more than rubber stamp approval. 
In response to the observation regarding the need to develop 
an empirical model, the question was raised as to whether the 
project could better the efforts currently ongoing at the ITC. 
Nevertheless, ECLAC will explore the possibility of developing a 
model, and will discuss the matter with ECLAC Santiago. 
IDB/ECLAC Project ATN/SF-3723-RE 
Support to the Process of Hemispheric Trade Liberalization 
Svunmary of the Third Meeting of the Advisory Committee 
May 28, 1992 
1. Three main topics were discussed at this meeting: (1) the 
substantive progress report prepared by ECLAC; (2) the use of an 
econometric model to evaluate the costs and benefits of a Western 
Hemispheric Free Trade Area; (3) the need to balance different 
perspectives. 
2. On the basis of the progress report, the Advisory 
Committee acknowledged the advancement already made and remarked 
the broad range of issues covered. The Committee noticed, however, 
that the overall content of the project will only emerge until all 
the consultants have been hired to cover the issues described in 
the working paper no. 2. Thus, the list of papers presented in the 
progress report constitutes a partial fulfillment of the more 
comprehensive final outcome. 
3. Returning to a point raised in previous meetings, the 
Committee again discussed the idea of developing an empirical 
model, perhaps similar to the EC's Cecchini Report. The merits of 
this idea were extensively reviewed, and the Committee was informed 
that ECLAC would make a proposal on the basis of the evaluation of 
12 models carried out by the United States International Trade 
Commission in 1991 (USITC Publication 2508, May 1992). 
4. The Committee suggested that ECLAC and the IDB would be 
the most qualified institutions to conduct the quantitative 
exercise on the Western Hemispheric Free Trade Area, although it 
was also recognized that such effort would take at least two years 
to be concluded. Therefore, it would be beyond the scope of the 
present project. 
5. Finally, the Committee recalled the need to preserve a 
balance within the project between different perspectives, derived 
from national outlooks, as well as between academics and 
practitioners 
6. Attached is the list of participants. 
PARTICIPANTS TO THE THIRD ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING 
THURSDAY, MAY 28, 1992 
MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
IDB 
Mr. William Cline 
Mr. Jorge Gallardo 
Ambassador Rubens Ricupero 
Mr. Enrique Iglesias, President IDB 
Ms. Nohra Rey de Marulanda, Manager DES 
Ms. Rosa Olivia Lawson, Deputy Manager DES 
Ms. Muni Figueres de Jiménez, Division Chief REG/ITD 
Mr. Daniel Szabo, Principal Advisor REG/DEP 
ECLAC WASHINGTON 
Mr. Issac Cohen, Director 
Ms. Ines Bustillo, Economic Affairs Officer 
Mr. Ronald Sprout, Economist 
Mr. José Tavares de Araujo, Economist 
IDB/ECLAC Project 
Support to the Process of Hemispheric Trade Liberalization 
Summary of the Fourth Meeting of the Advisory Committee 
Washington, D.C. 
July 8, 1992 
1. With the participation of Messrs. Cline and Ricupero, the 
meeting was devoted to two topics with primary emphasis on: (a) 
the development of an empirical model to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of a Western Hemispheric Free Trade Area (WHFTA); and 
(b) a review of the third colloquium. 
2. The ITC's efforts to evaluate existing empirical models and 
assess the building of its own model for a WHFTA was outlined by 
ECLAC. A preliminary estimate by the ITC on the construction of a 
model for the hemisphere included the use of at least 10.5 man-
years of professional staff and 3 man-years of support staff. 
3. The advisors concurred on several points: (a) the development 
of a model that would add credibility to the Project remains a 
priority; (b) a cooperative approach with the ITC merits 
consideration; and (c) a less ambitious model could be built with 
fewer resources, of between $2 00,000 and $3 00,000. 
4. After a discussion of the different alternatives, the advisors 
recommended: (a) the construction of the less ambitious model 
based upon an assessment by the IDB and ECLAC of the availability 
of the project's resources; (b) should available resources be 
deemed insufficient, ECLAC should explore the possibility of 
carrying out a joint effort of model construction that could 
involve several interested Latin American governments and the 
ITC. 
5. An estimate of the time frame for the construction of the less 
ambitious model concluded that preliminary results should be 
available by June 1993 and final results by December 1993. 
6. The IDB-ECLAC project, as a preliminary step and whichever 
alternative of model construction finally prevails, will produce 
a working paper describing and evaluating the existent models. 
7. To conclude, ECLAC presented a brief review of the last 
colloquium, held in Toronto, May 31 - June 2. A written summary 
of the proceedings will soon be circulated. 

IDB/ECLAC Project 
Support to the Process of Hemispheric Trade Liberalization 
Summary of the Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Committee 
Washington, D.C. 
September 18, 1992 
1. With the participation of Messrs. Ricupero, Gallardo, and 
Mclntyre, and the Executive Secretary of ECLAC, the meeting was 
devoted to discussions on the progress of the project, including 
the remaining colloquia, a quantitative model, and the two 
conferences scheduled for next year. 
2. Regarding the model, it was recognized that given limited 
resources and time, a focus on a sample of countries or sample of 
products might be a feasible means to proceed. It was suggested 
that one approach, as a spinoff, might be to develop a software 
which could provide governments the means to assess the impact of 
hemispheric trade liberalization possibilities on their 
particular countries (i.e., develop the tools to analyze country 
costs and benefits). It was also felt that an important role of 
the project would be to evaluate existing models. 
3. Some discussion was devoted to the role and format of the 
conferences (scheduled for February and March 1992). What should 
the final outcome be? Should there be a final communique, for 
example? Position papers per major project headings? Who should 
come? It was recognized that one important purpose of the 
conferences should be the dissemination of project results in the 
form of project working papers. 
4. Broader discussions centered on the role of the project in 
light of evolving global realities, some of which may adversely 
affect the likelihood of a WHFTA. For example, the resistance in 
the U.S. over NAFTA, and the uncertain resolve of the U.S. 
administration to negotiate FTAs with Latin America (beyond 
Chile). One suggestion was to conduct a reappraisal of the 
direction of the project after the second conference to take 
stock of these realities. It was recognized, nevertheless, that 
such possible ominous trends justify even more the purpose of the 
project. The importance of trade liberalization for Latin America 
and U.S. exports can only increase. 
5. It was recommended that John Weeks, the Canadian trade 
negotiator, could be invited to the fifth colloquium to 
complement the participation by Jaime Zabludovsky. 
6. Finally, it was also recommended that the next advisory 
committee meeting be held in November, before the sixth 
colloquium (scheduled for November 30 - Deceiober 1) and after the 
U.S. elections. 
IBB/ECLAC PRCXTECT 
Support to the Process of Hemispheric Trade Liberalization 
Summary of the sixth Meeting of the Advisory Committee 
Washington, D.C. 
November 19, 1992 
1. With the participation of Messrs. Cline, Gallardo, Ostry and 
Ricupero, the meeting was devoted to drawing an overview of the 
prospects for hemispheric trade liberalization in the present 
context offered by the electoral outcome in the United States and 
the course of events related to the Uruguay Round. 
2. The political transition in the United States comes at a time 
when Latin America and the Caribbean represent one of the most 
important and fastest growing markets for U.S. exports. Hence the 
NAFTA may be ratified and Hemispheric trade may remain a policy 
priority for the U.S. government. In the meantime, Latin American 
and Caribbean partners may be able to consolidate their economic 
adjustment programs. 
3. The outcome of the Uruguay Round remains uncertain and a 
stagnant global economy is not conducive to support further 
Hemispheric trade liberalization. The fast-track clock is ticking 
and the time left to submit a GATT agreement is running short (it 
must be submitted by March 1993) . The Clinton Administration may be 
politically capable of requesting and being granted a brief 
extension of fast-track procedures if the negotiations on 
agriculture conclude soon, thus allowing for a subsequent 
resolution of other issue areas such as services and market access. 
4. Regarding the project's activities, the timing seems ripe for 
disseminating results. The objectives should be to educate and to 
help avert a reversal of trade liberalization and integration 
efforts in the Hemisphere. 
5. Finally, there may be two additional Advisory Committee 
meetings next year, before and after the formal conferences which 
are scheduled for the first half of 1993. 
IDB/ECLAC Project 
Support to the Process of Hemispheric Trade Liberalization 
Summary of the Seventh Meeting of the Advisory Committee 
Washington, D.C. 
June 22, 1993 
With the participation of project advisors, Messrs. Cline, 
Gallardo, Ricupero, Ms. Ostry, and project evaluator, Joaquin Izcue, 
the meeting was devoted to a review of the progress of the project to 
date. This included an assessment of recent past events—the Sao Paulo 
colloquium and Santiago conference, in particular—and a review of what 
remains—the final conference, the models, the book, the formal project 
evaluation process and, more generally, issues of dissemination. 
In general, it was observed that the basic purpose of the project-
-that of igniting a debate—has been achieved. The Sao Paulo colloquium 
was singled out as particularly effective in this regard. Both the Sao 
Paulo colloquium and the Santiago conference displayed the value of 
examining the issues in different countries, and to different groups. 
In Sao Paulo, the involvement of the Brazilian private sector was an 
important ingredient to its success. Consideration is being given to 
co-hosting additional colloquia in other countries where interest has 
been expressed. 
Dates have not yet been set for the final conference. An effort 
has been made to include NAFTA players at a senior level, and the IDB 
is currently waiting to hear from them. It is important that the final 
papers and the models results be disseminated at this conference. A 
special session updating the status of the Uruguay Round and NAFTA may 
be merited. 
Preliminary results from the two CGE models commissioned by the 
project are expected in July. One of these modelling efforts will 
continue beyond the project with IDB support. Once again, some debate 
ensued on the merits of modeling. The models cannot capture everything, 
and hence it is important not to overestimate the importance of the 
models and their results. On the other hand, they can serve as a 
further basis for dialogue and debate. 
The task of formally evaluating the project was discussed. 
Completion of the first draft of the evaluation is planned for early 
August. It would be helpful if the second conference and the models are 
included in the final analysis. 
Dissemination of the efforts of the project was discussed at 
length. More attention needs to be focused on how to reach the private 
sector in Latin America, as well as relevant groups in Europe and 
Japan. Some suggestions were made, though further thought and effort is 
needed. It was suggested that an executive summary and/or a free-
standing introduction of the book be written so that it could be 
distributed separately, as a brochure. 
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IDB/ECLAC PROJECT 
PARTICIPANTS BY SECTOR 
Country 6.R. Private Public R&A Int. 
Org. 
Other Ttl 
Argentina 1 1 13 11 2 28 
Australia 1 1 2 
Bahamas 1 1 
Barbados 1 1 
Belgium 1 3 4 
Bolivia 1 2 3 
Brazil 1 27 12 13 5 2 60 
Canada 1 19 14 17 1 1 53 
Chile 1 3 4 7 4 19 
Colombia 1 2 3 4 4 14 
Costa 
Rica 
1 4 3 1 9 
Dominican 
Republic 
1 4 5 
Ecuador 1 5 1 1 8 
El Salvador 3 5 
France 1 2 3 
Germany 1 3 4 
Guatemala 1 2 3 3 9 
Guyana 1 1 2 4 
Haiti 1 1 
country G.R. Private Public R&A Int. 
org. 
Other Ttl 
Honduras 1 1 1 3 
Israel 1 1 
Italy 1 1 2 
Jamaica 1 1 2 4 
Japan 1 3 4 
Mexico 1 1 10 5 17 
Netherlands 1 2 3 
Nicaragua 1 1 2 
Panama 1 1 
Paraguay 1 1 2 
Peru 1 2 2 3 8 
Portugal 1 1 
Puerto 
Rico 
4 1 5 
Spain 1 1 2 
Sri Lanka 1 1 
Switzerland 1 1 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
1 1 2 1 5 
Turkey 1 1 
U.K. 2 1 3 
Country 6.R. Private Public RSA Int. 
Org. 
Other Ttl 
U.S.A. 1 17 18 51 2 3 92 
Uruguay 1 2 4 1 1 9 




Ttl 38 94 104 131 35 7 409 
*Sri Lanka 
**Trinidad y Tobago 

IDB/ECLAC PROJECT 
SUPPORT TO THE PROCESS OF HEMISPHERIC TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION 
FIRST COLLOQUIUM 
Inter-American Development Bank 
1300 New York Avenue, N.W. 
Room Andres Bello 
Washington, D.C. 20577 
THURSDAY, JANUARY 23 1992 
08:00 - 09:00 Registration 
09:00 - 10:00 Orientation 
Nohra Rey de Marulanda 
DES Manager, IDE 
10:00 - 10:30 Opening Remarks 
Enrique Iglesias 
President, IDE 
10:30 - 11:00 Economic Overview of Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Gert Rosenthal 
Executive Secretary, ECLAC 
11:00 - 11:30 Comments by Panel Chair: Nolira Rey de Marulanda DES Manager, IDE 
Panelists: C. Fred BergSten, Director, H E 
Carlos Primo Braga, Economist, IBRD 
Santiago Levy, Professor, Boston U. 
11:30 - 11:45 Coffee Break 
11:45 - 12:30 Administrative Matters 
13:00 - 14:30 Lunch 
Offered by President Iglesias 
14:30 - 15:00 IDB/ECLAC Project 
Isaac Cohen, Director, ECLAC, Proj. Coordinator 
15:00 - 15:30 Questions and Answers 
15:30 - 15:45 Coffee Break 
15:45 - 18:00 Presentations: 
Government Representatives 
18:30 - 20:00 Reception 
Offered by the IDB 
FRIDAY, JANUARY 24 1992 
09:00 - 11:00 Presentations: 
Government Representatives 
11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break 
11:30 - 12:00 Wrap-up session 
Isaac Cohen 
IDB/ECLAC PROJECT 
Support to the Process of Hemispheric Trade Liberalization 
FIRST COLLOQUIUM 
SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSIONS 
1. On January 23 and 24, the first colloquium of the IDB/ECLAC 
project took place at the IDB headquarters in Washington, DC. 
The purpose of this colloquium was to inform the project's "liaison 
committee" about the goals of the project as well as gather their 
suggestions with respect to the topics that would be of interest to 
include in the work program. Attached is the list of participants. 
2. The colloquium started with Nohra Rey de Marulanda, DES 
Manager, providing an overview of the nature of the project and the 
role to be played by the members of the "liaison committee." 
3. In the Opening Remarks, Enrique Iglesias, President of the 
IDB, placed the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) in 
global and regional contexts. On both levels, there is great 
change, many challenges, yet much promise as well. The hemisphere 
has in fact been experiencing a "silent revolution." EAI itself 
has stimulated the integration process within Latin America. It is 
a proposal that does not deny the ongoing sub-integration efforts 
of the hemisphere, but in fact includes these efforts. In this 
context, there is a need to open up a dialogue to discuss the 
options, and to maintain direct contact with the governments of the 
region. 
4. Gert Rosenthal, Executive Secretary of ECLAC, provided further 
regional context for EAI and the IDB-ECLAC project. There are some 
very encouraging signs for the region including modest economic 
growth in 1991 coupled with a reduction in inflation, growing 
access to international capital markets, a positive change in 
attitudes, improvement in debt indicators, and growth of intra-
regional trade. By unilaterally opening up, the region has in fact 
put its house in order at considerable risk. It is too early to 
say whether the world is breaking up into inward-oriented trading 
blocs or moving to the ideal envisioned in the Uruguay Round. At 
any rate, the region is better off continuing its course of 
domestic reforms and regional integration regardless of the global 
outcome. The purpose of this project is to lay out to the 
governments the options available so that they may exploit the 
opportunities and minimize the risks. 
5. Three panelists, C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for 
International Economics; Santiago Levy, Professor, Boston 
University; and Alberto Primo Braga, economist. The World Bank made 
comments to the above mentioned presentations. Mr. Bergsten 
asserted that Latin America and the Caribbean may become a "modest 
locomotive for world growth," as a result of the economic 
adjustments undertaken during the 1980s and that the prospects of 
a free trade agreement would allow to lock-in reforms, provide an 
insurance against future protectionism, and stimulate investment 
confidence. Mr. Levy, however, warned that the costs and benefits 
of unilateral adjustment must be weighed against those of bi-
lateral or multilateral trade liberalization and emphasized the 
need to reevaluate the domestic programs of adjustment so as to 
take into consideration severe economic and social inequities. 
Mr. Braga stated that Latin America has "scored high" in unilateral 
as well as in multilateral liberalization, despite balance of 
payments difficulties. He added that domestic investment in 
building human capital, infrastructure and communication networks 
could make the region more attractive to investors seeking to 
globalize production strategies. 
6. In the afternoon, Isaac Cohen, Director, ECLAC/Washington, and 
the coordinator of the project, presented an outline of the issues 
to be studied when considering the formation of a Western 
Hemisphere free trade area as described in the attached working 
paper "A Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area: An Overview of the 
Issues" (Distributed at the colloquium). 
7. In general, there was consensus on the proposal of a framework 
of what to study about a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area 
(WHFTA). Government representatives emphasized, in particular, the 
need to address cost and benefit considerations as well as 
practical negotiating issues. In addition, several representatives 
pointed out the importance of studying the existing sub-regional 
integration systems. In this respect, it was considered very 
useful to draw an inventory of trade barriers by countries and sub-
regions, as well as to analyze the progress of trade reforms. 
8. The need to analyze costs and benefits from trade 
liberalization at the country level by types of countries was 
especially noted. Such analysis should ideally include an 
assessment of the impact on trade, investment, employment, and GDP. 
It was specifically mentioned that smaller countries might not 
receive a proportionate share of the benefits, consequently, the 
feasibility and desirability of preferential treatment schemes 
between countries in which benefits and costs are asymmetrically 
distributed is merited. In addition, the impact of trade 
liberalization on sectors such as agriculture, industry, services, 
energy will differ, hence there is a need for disaggregation at the 
sectoral level. 
9. Special emphasis was placed on the usefulness of addressing 
practical, concrete concerns, and allowing for flexibility in the 
agenda. A focus on the practical issues that constitute the 
negotiating agenda, such as rules of origin, safeguards, non-tariff 
barriers, dispute settlement procedures, would be of great value to 
prepare for the negotiations. It was also noted that the agenda 
had to be flexible so as to accommodate to forthcoming events such 
as the outcome of the Uruguay Round or NAFTA, that would unfold 
during the duration of the project. 
10. Finally, at the wrap-up session, Isaac Cohen and Nohra Rey de 
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LIBERALIZATION 
SECOND COLLOQUIUM 
Inter-American Development Bank 
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1300 New York Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20577 
THURSDAY, APRIL 301992 
08:00 - 09:00 Registration 
09:00 - 09:30 Opening Remarks by President Enrique Iglesias, IDB 
09:30 - 10:45 "Why a Free Trade Agreement is in the Western 
Hemisphere's Interest" by R. Dombusch, MIT 
Discussants: J. Reis Velloso, IBMEC, Brazil 
A. Bianchi, consultant, Chile 
Chair: Nohra Rey de Marulanda, IDB 
10:45 - 11:00 Coffee Break 
11:00 - 12:15 "Trading Blocs and Multilateralism" by P. 
Krugman, MIT 
Discussants: H. Assael, ECLAC 
G. Perry, Fedesarrollo, Colombia 
Chair: E. Carrington, Ambassador, 
Trinidad & Tobago 
12:15 - 14:15 Lunch Break 
14:15 - 15:30 "North American Free Trade Area: Needed 
Stimulus for WHFTA and Beyond" by R. Pastor, 
Emory University 
Discussants: E. Lizcmo. Consultant,- Costa Rica 
R. Sleeker, American University 
Chair: G. Rosenthal, Executive 
Secretary ECLAC 
15:30 - 15:45 Coffee Break 
15:45 - 17:00 "WHFTA and Japan: Perceptions and Relations" 
by A. Hosono, University of Tskuba 
Discussants: P. Motta Veiga, FUNCEX, Brazil 
C. Echeverría, FEDEPRICAP, COS ta 
Rica 
Chair: E. Moyobre, Venezuela m 
18:00 - 20:00 Reception Offered by the IDE 
FRIDAY, MAY 1 1992 
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M. Carden, SAIS, Johns Hopkins 
University 
A. Fishlow, Berkeley University 
Rosa Olivia Lawson, IDB 
10:15 - 10:30 Coffee Break 
m 10:30 - 12:30 Lessons from other Multilateral Trade Liberalization Agreements 
EEC by S. Griffith-Jones & C. Stevens, university 
of Sussex 
Israel - Ds FTA by K. Patterson & D. James 
Discussant: J. Bruton, American Chamber of 
Commerce of Mexico, Mexico 
G. Chichilnisky, Columbia 
University 
Chair: I. Hodara, H & H Trade, S.A., 
Uruguay 
12:30 - 13:00 Closing Remarks, ECLAC 










Support to the Process of Hemispheric Trade Liberalization 
Summary of the Second Colloquium 
"Global Issues" 
Washington/ D.C. 
April 30 - May l, 1992 
1. In the context of two opposing global forces at work (one of 
integration, the other disintegration), and of substantial, largely 
promising domestic economic and political change within the Western 
Hemisphere, a major question for the countries of the region is how 
to insert themselves into the world economy, how to link up to the 
international arena. What are the alternatives that this 
integration can take, the cost and benefit considerations, and the 
strategies to consider? With a focus on a Western Hemispheric free 
trade area (WHFTA), while drawing on lessons from trading regimes 
and agreements elsewhere, this colloquium provided the framework to 
address such questions. 
I. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF A WHFTA 
2. Many opportunities exist for the countries of the 
hemisphere, though with these come substantial risks. It was 
recognized that a WHFTA represents one such important opportunity. 
To assess a priori the net effects of a WHFTA, however, is not 
possible in light of many uncertainties—including the current and 
medium term global context, the many possible manifestations that 
a WHFTA could take, and the alternative means to proceed. To a 
great extent, "much depends on how it is done." Similarly, it is 
important to bear in mind that while there are gains from trade 
liberalization in a free trade area (FTA), these gains will not 
accrue automatically, because opportunities should be seized. 
I) BENEFITS 
(a) Economic Gains 
3. Trade liberalization brings in its wake many familiar 
economic benefits, fundamentally increased efficiency and greater 
economic growth. Static gains accrue from an improved allocation 
of resources on the basis of existing comparative advantages. 
Dynamic gains, probably more significant, result from an increase 
in efficiency in production and the development of new comparative 
advantages. 
4. One difficulty in assessing a priori the economic gains from 
trade liberalization in the context of a regional FTA stems from 
the difficulty in sorting out the effects from trade creation with 
those from trade diversion. Geography and the existing trade flows 
may indicate, however, that trade diversion may be relatively small 
in a WHFTA. A WHFTA in this sense might be considered a "natural" 
trading area. 
(b) Beyond Economic Gains 
5. At any rate, it was widely recognized that there is much more 
than economic gains to be had in a WHFTA. There is much more than 
"free trade and cookies" at stake. Economic integration can 
produce favorable political repercussions such as more peaceful and 
stable relations between members. Compare the historically hostile 
relations between the major European countries prior to the 
formation of the European Community (EC) with the political climate 
today. Similarly, it was contended that the impending North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) could reduce political 
barriers concomitant with the economic. NAFTA will serve to 
"sensitize and civilize" each member country towards each other. 
6. NAFTA and WHFTA also may serve as catalysts to inject renewed 
vigor into the multilateral trading system in two ways. First, 
Western Hemispheric FTAs may provide critical leverage for the 
United States and the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries 
on the EC and Japan, in particular towards renewed efforts at 
furthering the multilateral trade liberalization process. Second, 
a regional FTA could provide an important laboratory for working 
out solutions that have eluded the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). A smaller number of negotiators, in some cases 
perhaps more like-minded on the issues, may result in more 
substantial accomplishments at the negotiating table. Achievements 
in the regional forum in turn could facilitate the multilateral 
negotiations. 
(c) Nature and Distribution of Inter-Country Gains 
7. It was noted that the nature of some of the gains from a 
WHFTA will likely vary according to country. For the United 
States, for example, closer trading relations with LAC can help 
alleviate potential and real concerns as regards security interests 
and migration trends. This is to say that the widespread poverty 
and extreme inequalities of the Hemisphere need to be a genuine 
concern for the United States and a WHFTA is perhaps one of the 
most effective means to address it. 
8. For the LAC countries, two significant dividends from an FTA 
were noted: (1) greater and more stable access to the U.S. market; 
and (2) the locking-in or institutionalization of the domestic 
reforms that have been ongoing throughout most of LAC over the past 
decade. A WHFTA would make policy backsliding very difficult. 
Both these dividends would also apply to the United States as well, 
though not with equal force and perhaps not with such 
effectiveness. 
9. It was also observed that the benefits from a WHFTA would not 
be even across countries. For example, the greater a country's 
existing trade with potential members in a regional FTA, the 
greater the benefits to that country from such an agreement. Other 
things equal, this would imply that membership in a WHFTA might be 
more compelling for countries, such as Mexico and Venezuela, which 
engage primarily in intra-hemispheric trade (and predominantly with 
the United States), than for countries, such as Chile and 
Argentina, which trade mostly with countries outside the 
hemisphere. 
10. In addition, the greater the trade barriers between two 
countries, the greater the benefits from barrier reductions between 
the two. 
11. Perhaps more fundamentally, it was observed that the more 
developed countries of the region would tend to benefit more from 
a WHFTA than their poorer neighbors. In part, because the more 
developed countries will tend to be in a better position—in light 
of better infrastructures and more established institutions, etc.— 
to take advantage of the opportunities that would arise. 
II) COSTS 
12. Some costs are inevitable. While it may be possible to 
devise a WHFTA whereby net economic gains result, there will be 
losers. While one perspective put forth that it is meaningless to 
determine who gains more (and who gains less) , it was also 
contended by some that such distributional considerations are 
politically very important. Hence, these distributive aspects will 
play an important role, along with needed policies implemented to 
redress the inequalities, towards a sustainable WHFTA. 
(a) Economic Costs 
13. It was contended that inequalities between domestic sectors 
within economies may at least initially increase with a WHFTA. In 
absolute as well as relative terms, some sectors and groups will be 
harmed unless effective compensatory mechanisms can be devised. 
14. It was also noted that the economic effects from trade 
liberalization depend on the terms in which it takes place. 
Immiserizing trade, for example, is a possibility if export growth 
contributes to terms of trade deterioration and, hence, decreased 
import capacity. This consideration is particularly germane to the 
LAC countries. 
15. In addition, those countries which currently have 
preferential access to the U.S. market (CBI and Andean countries) 
might see benefits eroded from a WHFTA. 
16. It was also recognized that an important consideration is the 
potentially large cost to those (probably small) countries that 
could be left out. Much of the costs would be manifested not only 
in trade volume losses (from trade diversion), but also in a 
deterioration in the excluded country's terms of trade vis-a-vis 
the member countries of the FTA, as well as in reduced investment 
attractiveness. 
(b) Beyond Economic Costs 
17. As with some of the gains, some of the costs may go beyond 
economics. It was observed, for example, that a loss of 
sovereignty might ensue from membership in a WHFTA. Domestic 
policymaking and economic policy vis-a-vis the rest of the world 
would necessarily have to be less flexible. 
18. It was also contended, however, that loss of sovereignty 
would be less significant in the case of an FTA in contrast to a 
customs union (CU). Furthermore, barriers to the rest of the world 
would probably tend to be lower in an FTA (where the lowest 
barriers among the member countries would tend to set the policy) 
than in a CU. In these respects, a WHFTA may be preferred over a CU. 
m 
n. SKEPTICISMS AND CAVEATS 
19. There may be two fundamental reasons for skepticism about a 
WHFTA from the U.S. perspective. First, on the export side, the 
LAC market is small relative to markets elsewhere. On the other 
hand, gains from increased exports to LAC, however relatively 
small, would still accrue from a WHFTA. Perhaps more importantly, 
what is the alternative? It was argued that markets in the EC and 
Japan are increasingly less accessible. 
20. Second, on the import side, there is the concern over 
competing with such low wages as those from LAC. This is a 
critical issue, one that lends credence to the merits of going 
slow, and to provide adequate adjustment programs. 
21. As to the current global context, the importance of a 
successful Uruguay Round (UR) was stressed as a critical 
ingredient, capable of producing favorable net effects for the 
Hemisphere and beyond. And while it was generally acknowledged 
that the UR negotiations would likely be pulled together, 
observations regarding why the multilateral trading system has been 
languishing and some implications were also noted. 
22. Reasons for the difficulties encountered by the GATT system 
include the growing importance of new and more complex issues at 
the negotiating table, the changing character of protectionism, the 
growing importance of new players in the world economy (Japan in 
particular), and, perhaps most fundamentally, the erosion of 
hegemonic stability. 
23. Some problems and tensions may be exacerbated by an FTA. 
From an increase in the volume of trade within the region, one can 
expect a greater number of disputes as well as some new problems. 
Groups and sectors will be hurt from the change. In addition, some 
of the trade disputes arising from a WHFTA may be more intractable 
than those in the past. This is in part the consequence of the 
substantial progress in ridding the economies of the region of many 
of the more transparent barriers at the borders (tariffs) leaving 
the "roots and stumps" (NTBs, for example) to tackle. 
24. Finally, two sobering considerations. First, the feasibility 
of extending NAFTA into a WHFTA was called into question. This was 
posited in part because of the diversity of the countries involved. 
It was also contended that the motives of the United States remain 
unclear. Will the United States be committed to an FTA beyond 
NAFTA? 
25. Second, the contention that the U.S. economy cannot be 
expected to serve in the 1990s as the engine of growth, as it did 
in the 1980s. It's demand boom is over. And in fact, a WHFTA 
would have the dubious distinction of including among its 
membership some of the most indebted economies in the world. And 
much needed capital for the hemisphere will likely have to be found 
in other parts of the world» A WHFTA cannot afford to be inward-
oriented. 
m. POLICY CONSroERATIONS TOWARDS A WHFTA 
I) AN EXTROVERTED WHFTA 
26. One of the most important characteristics of a desirable 
WHFTA is that it be open-oriented vis-a-vis the rest of the world. 
It m.ust be compatible with the multilateral trading system; a 
"building bloc" rather than a "stumbling bloc." Regional FTAs need 
not conflict with the principles of the GATT, and it was observed 
that a WHFTA, as currently conceived, could be GATT compatible. 
27. An important corollary for the countries of the region is 
that they must not close options with other regions of the world. 
Alternatively phrased, there must be a constructive role for Japan 
and Europe in particular in any WHFTA. Both the EC and Japan have 
an interest and stake in LAG 'S development. 
28. Perhaps Japan in particular has exhibited this through public 
sector support, witness its contribution in the Multilateral 
Investment Fund (MIF), of the Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative (EAI). 
29. On the other hand, the private sector in Japan is much more 
cautious as regards a WHFTA and private investment from Japan much 
less forthcoming than public funds. In this vein, the nature of 
the rules of origin devised in any WHFTA has a very critical role 
to play as regards private investment from regions outside the 
hemisphere. 
II) COMPENSATORY MECHANISMS 
30. One fundamental strategic objective in a WHFTA—and one that 
will be very difficult to achieve—must be to distribute the gains 
so as to enfranchise the losers, while at the same time without 
alienating the winners. This calls for compensatory mechanisms 
within countries and between countries. 
(a) Domestic Compensatory Mechanisms and Other Domestic 
Policies 
31. The need for domestic adjustment mechanisms implies a 
constructive role for the state to ensure that considerations of 
fairness and development be adequately addressed. 
32. In addition, there are other domestic policies that must be 
undertaken and domestic conditions that need to be met, so as to 
maximize the net gains of a WHFTA and ensure its sustainability. 
It was argued that some of the discussions have been putting the 
cart before the horse. An FTA, it was contended, is the "icing on 
the cake," and before you can get there, you need to "eat your 
vegetables." 
(b) Preferential Treatment and Harmonization Arrangements 
Between Countries 
33. The need and desirability of preferential treatment between 
countries was much debated. On the one hand, it was felt that such 
policies may contribute to a resurrection of some of the failed 
trade policies of the past. On the other hand, some felt that 
policies should be devised that would be able to address the 
asymmetry of the relations; that could be transparent and 
temporary, and hence not a drag on competition. It was also argued 
that these mechanisms were even more important than in the case of 
the EC, in light of the greater development gap between countries 
of this hemisphere. 
34. A very similar debate also ensued which focused on the 
necessity for harmonization arrangements—of wages and 
environmental standards in particular. Too much harmonization, it 
was argued on the one hand, may not be in the best interest of 
either the U.S. or the LAC countries. It would erode some of the 
comparative advantage of the lower wage country. It would also 
result in higher prices for consumers in the U.S. It was hence 
argued that perhaps we need to "live with the differences and trade 
on the basis of them." 
35. Yet, it was also suggested that perhaps the objective should 
be to try to bridge the income differential between the U.S. and 
the LAC countries (roughly 9-to-l) to more closely coincide with 
comparative advantages based on productivity differentials between 
the two (roughly 3-to-l). 
36. At any rate, perhaps pushing for equality too soon would be 
counterproductive. The central focus might better be an emphasis 
on greater economic grov/th. Furthermore, some felt that bringing 
too much into the negotiations and attempting the overly ambitious 
would reduce the likelihood of achieving progress, to avoid letting 
"perfection be the enemy of good." 
Ill) TIMING 
37. Considerations of timing are critical. On the one hand, the 
sense among many was that now existed a window of opportunity for 
a WHFTA. There is a need to take advantage of the momentum towards 
reform in LAC before it slows, and a need to capitalize on the 
initiative put forth by the United States before the initiative 
wanes. Otherwise, the pendulum may swing back on both sides. 
There may be indications that this is already happening. 
38. On the other hand, while momentum needs to be maintained, we 
must not be hasty. There are merits in going slow. Much can be 
learned from EC experience on this. Let's be fully aware of what 
we are getting into. 
39. In addition, the timing of the negotiations between countries 
of the Hemisphere—the order of negotiations and country groupings-
-is critical. Much concern was expressed about the "hub and spoke" 
strategy. This may speak for going slow as well. 
40. After NAFTA, what next? Limited resources and logistics may 
realistically demand that bilateral agreements between the U.S. and 
LAC countries be the primary route to a hemispheric FTA. If so, 
some argued that the more open countries (and those who have 
already "eaten their vegetables") deserve the reward of being next. 
41. In contrast, a proposal was put forth that Brazil be next in 
line after NAFTA. Such a strategy would bring sizable gains to the 
U.S. and hence political support and perhaps greater commitment in 
the U.S.. It would also make it much more difficult for other LAC 
countries to remain outside. It was alternatively suggested that 
perhaps it would make more sense that Mercosur, of which Brazil is 
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a part, be next in line to negotiate with North America. 
IV. LESSONS FROM OTHER 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGREEMENTS 
I) THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
42. Lessons were drawn from integration experiences of the EC. 
Public funds can play a vital role in mitigating inequalities that 
would tend to result from trade integration and in providing for 
needed infrastructural projects to ensure sustainability of the 
integration effort. Guaranteeing private funds by the state also 
merits consideration. While ancillary support should develop in 
stages (in part to remain in synchronization with political 
support), it is nevertheless important to raise the issues at an 
early stage. 
43. As regards the EC's experience with preferential arrangements 
with its developing country trading partners, it was concluded that 
such preferences have been effective under particular 
circumstances. Evidence suggests that success occurred in cases 
where large preference margins existed, and in countries which were 
able to take advantage of the preferences (i.e., countries with the 
supply capacity to respond to the opportunities). 
II) THE UNITED STATES - ISRAEL FTA 
44. Lessons were drawn from the United States-Israel FTA on what 
can be expected from an FTA with the United States. 
45. The U.S.-Israel FTA is the first entered into by the United 
States, and has been in existence for seven years. This provides 
for ample time to extract a track record of its viability. The 
agreement is fully consistent with the GATT (with Article XXIV in 
particular), in part because the rules of origin (35% domestic 
content) are not unduly restrictive. The agreement is short 
(certainly relative to the U.S. - Canada FTA) and this provides for 
much needed flexibility. However, it is interesting to note that 
in case of conflict between the FTA and the GATT, the FTA prevails. 
Furthermore, anti-dumping and countervailing duties were 
specifically excluded from the agreement. 
46. While the agreement has perhaps served both countries better 
than the counter factual of an absence of such a treaty, certain 
difficulties from the perspective of Israel—in particular, some 
erosion of benefits—have arisen. This erosion has stemmed from 
the ability of the U.S. Congress to override the agreement (which 
is entered into by the Executive Branch), from the ability of 
individual states to do the same, and at times from the tendency 
for subsequent legislation on other matters—often inadvertently— 
to supersede the FTA. 
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1. This colloquium provided a forum to discuss a wide range of 
practical topics about hemispheric trade liberalization among a 
diverse group of participants, drawn from throughout the 
hemisphere from academia, the private sector, governments, and 
international organizations. The sessions addressed many 
negotiating issues germane to trade agreements, the costs and 
benefits from liberalization and a Western Hemisphere Free Trade 
Area (WHFTA), and hemispheric integration processes, including 
the role of institutions and the inter-related roles of Canada, 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries and the United 
States. Throughout the colloquium, lessons from Canada and the 
Canadian - United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) were 
drawn. Elaboration of some of these themes is provided below. 
2. The overall tone of the colloquium was one of cautious 
optimism. While the issues and processes are complex, it was 
recognized that opportunities do exist. There are also mutual 
interests between the major players in the hemisphere. The need 
for a rules-based hemispheric order was recognized. There was 
less agreement on where to go from here, and how to get there. 
I. COST AND BENEFIT CONSIDERATIONS 
i) ECONOMIC GAINS 
3. It was widely recognized that the Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative (EAI) and, in particular, a WHFTA are promising 
developments for the hemisphere. There are opportunities to be 
seized. 
4. Anticipating impacts from a WHFTA, however, is complicated in 
part by the lack of precedents. The various regional trade 
liberalization arrangements throughout the world are all very 
much distinct. Assessing impacts is further complicated by the 
fact that the EAI remains largely a vision rather than a concrete 
blueprint. 
5. Nevertheless, some assessments were noted with some variation 
in results. One study concluded that large potential income gains 
to all regions of the Western Hemisphere from a WHFTA were 
possible. The largest gains would likely accrue to the LAC. 
Static gains, for example, to LAC countries (exclusive of Mexico) 
were calculated to be in the order of 11 percent of regional GDP. 
6. On a more general level, it was observed that there was much 
room for trade creation in the hemisphere in the light of 
relatively small intra-hemispheric trade flows. On the other 
hand, the large inter-hemispheric trade flows, particularly 
between the United States and other regions of the world, point 
to the importance of maintaining an open-oriented WHFTA vis-a-vis 
the rest of the world. With this clearly being in the interest of 
the U.S., likelihood of a WHFTA becoming a fortress may be slim. 
In this vein, several participants contended that the costs from 
trade diversion are likely to be modest. 
7. While it was noted that gains will likely be realized from a 
free trade agreement (FTA), trade liberalization itself is 
probably not the "driver" in the economic growth and development 
process. Domestic conditions and policies are probably more 
important. Trade liberalization, in other words, tends to be only 
part of a more comprehensive process, typically serving as a 
signal or shorthand for this broader process, from which economic 
gains derive. 
8. Similarly, it was observed that while trade liberalization by 
itself will not likely attract foreign direct investment (FDI), 
LAC countries now experiencing an inflow of capital and 
investment are those which have been undergoing trade 
liberalization, though accompanied by a host of other market 
friendly reforms. FDI flows are a function in large part of 
stability and political considerations, as well as of country 
size. 
ii) INTRA-COUNTRY DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS PROM TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION 
9. Distributional considerations were discussed at some length. 
This included the role and special concerns of, and anticipated 
impacts on the small and medium size enterprise (SME) from trade 
liberalization. While expectations may be that freer trade will 
adversely affect the SME, and while some evidence—such as the 
Chilean experience—may support this, more data and a better 
understanding of the dynamics is needed. The Canadian experience, 
for example, shows a tendency for much growth among SMEs during 
the trade liberalization period to date. 
10. With trade negotiations encompassing much more than trade 
issues, discerning distributional effects becomes more 
complicated. An FTA may affect social and distributional concerns 
directly, but also indirectly through its effect on domestic 
policymaking. Certain domestic regulations or policies with a 
strong social dimension may be constrained. 
11. Economic theory tells us that the factor of production which 
is less mobile or less intensively used will experience a 
decrease in its return with trade liberalization. The concern for 
the impact of trade liberalization on the Northern unskilled 
worker is well-founded. In fact, LAC needs to be prepared to 
respond to Northern concerns of minimum labor standards. This is 
not just for defensive reasons (to avoid unilateral remedy 
action) but also to ensure that competition among LAC countries 
does not bid wages down. It is necessary to learn from Europe how 
to achieve a degree of harmonization through the raising of 
standards. At a bare minimum, there is a need for monitoring and 
evaluation of labor conditions in member countries of NAFTA as 
well as of WHFTA. 
12. Short term adjustment costs from liberalization can have 
significant distributional effects, and hence need to be 
addressed. Such costs are often understated. These short term 
considerations, for example, tend not to be captured in existing 
empirical models. 
iii) VARYING IMPACTS PER COUNTRY TYPE 
13. There was recognition of the need to take account of varying 
effects from trade liberalization on different regions in the 
hemisphere and on countries at different stages in the 
development and liberalization process. 
14. Particular concern was expressed as regards the impacts on 
the small countries of the region. There was concern on several 
fronts: (a) of trade and investment diversion from the Caribbean 
countries as a result of NAFTA; (b) of a docking clause without 
any input on the substance of the trade agreement from those 
countries which might dock7 (c) of erosion of preferential 
arrangements; and (d) of constraining conditionality. 
15. On the other hand, it was noted that moving from a non-
reciprocal arrangement to a reciprocal one contained some 
benefits: likely greater security and access to the U.S. market, 
and similarly, a greater range of products to be liberalized. 
iv) TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFECTS: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE AND 
LESSONS 
16. While free trade may be good policy, it has not particularly 
been good politics in Canada's case. Four out of five Canadians 
believe Canada should participate in NAFTA. Yet, fewer than one 
in three have a positive attitude toward it. 
17. The trade liberalization process in Canada largely preceded 
the CUSFTA. The experience was one of gradual trade 
liberalization accompanied by economic growth. The oil and 
petrochemical industries were cited as examples of Canada's shift 
to market forces in trade and investment policy (in contrast to 
Mexico) prior to an FTA with the U.S. 
18. Concerned about being excluded from the U.S. market, Canada 
entered the trade talks for defensive reasons. The Canadian 
experience with the FTA has not been easy. While systematic 
assessments of CUSFTA's effects on Canada's economy have not yet 
been forthcoming, a-fairly widespread perception, supported by 
much anecdotal evidence, attributes some firm relocations to the 
U.S. and consequential unemployment to the agreement. 
19. This may be short term. Productivity may be rising from trade 
liberalization. Gains in employment may be accruing in other 
sectors (most of these are projected in the service sector). It 
is also true that Canada's exports to the U.S. have increased 
during the period since the CUSFTA was signed. At any rate, it is 
very difficult to sort out the effects from trade liberalization 
with the current recession in Canada. 
20. Another concern is the perceived negative impact of free 
trade on Canada's cultural identity and nationality. 
21. Some lessons from the Canadian experience include: (a) 
reduced expectations of major economic improvements following an 
FTA with the U.S. or trade liberalization more generally; and (b) 
public support may wane without adjustment policies; social 
policy needs to be seen as an investment. 
II- NEGOTIATION ISSUES 
i) NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
22. The negotiation process in some respects differs widely today 
from the past. The issues are more complex and involve much more 
than trade issues at the borders. Negotiations today imply very 
major economic reforms. 
23. The frontiers of the negotiation agenda are elastic. 
"Everything's on the table." The U.S. - Japan Structural 
Impediments Initiative (SII) may serve as a harbinger of what's 
to come. The most important new issues are labor and the 
environment as they relate to trade. Environmental issues will 
probably become the more dominant of the two, given trends in the 
lobbying strength of the "greens" relative to labor. 
24. Furthermore, while enough is known about how to deal with 
liberalizing goods, not much is known about services. 
25. However, some aspects of the negotiation process have not 
changed. It is an educational, not an ideological process. 
Countries have much to learn and hence to gain from the 
negotiation process. 
26. Secondly, negotiations are cumulative. Be they multilateral, 
bilateral, or regional, negotiations build on each other. 
27. Ultimately, the negotiation process is essentially political, 
a function of domestic politics. This means that gains are 
sometimes incremental, because the process can go only as quickly 
as the public allows. The negotiations "can only solve what the 
traffic will bear, and inevitably some issues will fall off the 
table in the process." 
28. There is a need for an appropriate data base. Without 
adequate information, one cannot negotiate rationally. With it, 
there exists a level and well-defined playing field. 
ii) RULES OF ORIGIN 
29. The importance of rules of origin and their effect in 
particular on FDI flows was recognized. It is true that tougher 
rules of origin encourage greater FDI, but this also encourages 
inefficiency and ultimately is welfare reducing. 
iii) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
30. The importance of dispute settlement (DS) mechanisms was 
stressed throughout the colloquium. A DS mechanism provides for 
predictability and enforceability; a means of "putting teeth into 
an agreement." 
31. Dispute settlement arrangements can vary by degree of 
formality ranging from negotiation, to mediation, to nonbinding 
arbitration, to binding arbitration. A qualitative difference 
exists between the first two types and the latter two, as the 
latter bring a third party into the process creating a political 
impetus to comply. DS arrangements vary widely in existing 
regional trade agreements, the strongest form of a tribunal found 
in the Andean Pact, and the weakest in CARICOM. 
32. The innovative DS arrangement for antidumping (AD) and 
countervailing (CV) duty actions of Chapter 19 of the CUSFTA has 
proved to be one of the most important elements of the agreement. 
This mechanism provides for the judicial review of AD and CV duty 
actions by means of binational panels. The review assesses the 
compatibility of an AD or CV duty action with the domestic law 
from which the action originated. It is binding and in lieu of 
judicial review by a domestic court. 
33o Clearly, the DS mechanism of Chapter 19 merits consideration 
as a model for a WHFTA. It is arguably working well in the CUSFTA 
context, and in fact has been viewed as one of the most 
successful DS mechanisms developed in recent years. The 
binational panels tend to promote greater consistency and 
objectivity in AD and CV duty practices, serving to de-politicize 
the process from the top down. 
34. The application of Chapter 19 DS, at least for a transition 
period in an FTA hence has several advantages for LAC to 
consider: (a) it gives exporters confidence of being treated 
fairly; (b) it would familiarize LAC with the procedures and 
legal system of North America; and (c) it would initiate 
recognition that some surrender of national autonomy is 
inevitable in any FTA. DS in general is fundamental, a necessary 
fall-back mechanism when trading with a more powerful neighbor. 
35. A very important consideration, however, is whether Chapter 
19 DS can be effectively applied in a broader trade agreement in 
light of widely different legal systems and trade rules 
throughout the hemisphere. In fact, it was observed that many LAC 
countries do not even have CD and AD systems. Is it worthwhile to 
develop these mechanisms for a transitory period? It was argued 
that LAC hasn't needed these mechanisms in the past in light of 
high trade barriers. Such mechanisms are critical in any trade 
liberalization process, as is a Chapter 19 DS mechanism. 
36. The role of DS in environmental and labor issues was raised. 
It was noted that one option advocated by labor and environmental 
groups as a means to enforce social standards is to have labor 
and environmental experts participate in the dispute panels. It 
was also pointed out, however, that as a prerequisite to DS on 
such issues, there is a need for agreement on rules and 
standards, and this has not yet come about. 
III. HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION 
i) INTEGRATION PROCESS 
37. Many at the colloquium commented on the "renaissance of 
integration" in LAC; on a "new nationalism." Abandoning earlier 
concepts of integration (ones that served to aggregate national 
inefficiencies), the region has adopted open-oriented 
integration, taking account of market logic and democratic 
systems. The efforts to integrate today, unlike those of the 
past, make more economic sense. 
38. There was nevertheless some debate as whether the integration 
process has been characterized by convergence and consolidation 
or disorder and fragmentation. Some argued that a more systematic 
framework, or means to proceed, is needed. Is it enough that the 
region shares a common positive attitude and stance towards more 
open and rational economies? 
39. In this vein, there was considerable concern over the 
bilateral "hub-and-spoke" integration method—alternatively 
referred to as the "solar" or "imperial" system. It was 
recognized that this method is the worst scenario, and it is not 
better coming from Mexico than from the United States. 
40. One approach was to explore what should be done. This 
included: (a) "no policy convergence without representation"; a 
democratized rules system weighted by population, not income per 
capita; and (b) intra-LAC country negotiations prior to LAC-North 
American negotiations (With the exception of Mexico and the 
Caribbean Basin, it was argued that intra-LAC relations are more 
important than those with the United States). 
41. Another approach was to envisage what will likely occur, and 
what steps, albeit limited, LAC can take to influence events. 
Some argued that the "hub-and-spoke" model will be the method of 
integration. Consequently, the LAC countries need to bargain hard 
to get the best deals possible, and emphasized that there are 
means to mitigate the bargaining power of the U.S., such as 
multinational DS panels and common institutions. 
42. The importance of accession to regional FTAs was stressed. It 
was noted that a docking clause in NAFTA would be a way to avoid 
the "hub-and-spoke" process. Further, with such a clause, future 
negotiations could focus on issues of transition rather than the 
contents of new trade agreements. At the time of the colloquium, 
it was not clear whether such a clause was being included in the 
NAFTA negotiations. It was observed that the U.S. had not yet 
flushed out a position on a docking clause. 
43. There was some concern regarding potential accession into 
regional groupings other than NAFTA as well. How open, for 
example, is MERCOSUR to new members? It was recognized that there 
was a need for greater transparency as regards accession to 
regional groups. 
44. More generally, it was observed that there exist two great 
markets of the region, the U.S. and Brazil, and that from these 
two are emerging two major blocs in the region. Much depends on 
the behavior of these two blocs. The hemispheric trade 
liberalization initiative has to be centered eventually on NAFTA 
and Mercosur. 
ii) ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
45. There was debate regarding the institutionalization process 
to accompany a WHFTA. On the one hand, some expressed concern 
about prematurely creating formal structures. Form should follow 
function, and the functions needed presently, it was argued, are 
that of monitoring and dialogue. Institutionalization should be 
gradual. Existing institutions should be used rather than 
creating new ones. 
46. It was noted that the bilateral framework agreements between 
the U.S. and LAC countries are a form of institutionalization 
which serve the function of dialogue. The U.S. is exploring how 
to institutionalize regional trade pacts. 
47. It was also noted that integration in the Western Hemisphere 
is not on the same level as European Community (EC) integration, 
and hence may not require the institutions that the EC does. The 
objective in a WHFTA should be a rules-based regime including 
maintenance of national law with non-national review (similar to 
Chapter 19 in CUSFTA). 
48. On the other hand, some argued that there was an 
institutional lag in the hemispheric integration process and a 
danger of not being able to sustain the process, if certain 
institutional measures, such as those undertaken by the EC, were 
not pursued. 
49. ALADI's role in the integration process was much discussed. 
Some participants emphasized the advantages of transforming ALADI 
to serve as the "embryo" of the hemispheric integration process. 
Through ALADI, a WHFTA would have the "flavor and color" of LAC. 
Will Latin Americans be brought together because of a U.S. 
initiative? Because it will be imperative or because it is a good 
idea? Should Canada and the U.S. not be invited to join ALADI? 
50. It was recognized that NAFTA was a potential flashpoint for 
ALADI and the region. NAFTA represents a very unique and 
challenging situation for ALADI because it is the first time that 
an ALADI member will be signing an FTA with nonmembers. Hence, 
must Mexico automatically extend it's privileges from NAFTA to 
the other ALADI members? 
51. The roles of the IDB, OAS, and ECLAC were also addressed. It 
was proposed that these three institutions could furnish basic 
support for the transition to a WHFTA. It was argued that it was 
better to work with the resources available in these existing 
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institutions rather than create new institutions. 
52. The tasks which would need to be addressed by the three 
institutions during the interim include: (a) information 
gathering and dissemination; (b) analytical problem solving; and 
(c) technical cooperation. Precedents of these institutions 
working together were cited as in the time of the Alliance for 
Progress. 
(ill) SMALL COUNTRY CONCERNS 
53. A number of concerns regarding implications of the 
integration process on small countries—the Caribbean Basin 
countries in particular—were expressed as noted in #14. On more 
general terms, the issue centers on how to negotiate among 
unequals. 
54. Suggested prescriptions include: (a) phase-in arrangements; 
(b) anti-dumping provisions for the small country; and (c) 
strengthening subregional systems to increase bargaining strength 
(don't rush; move together). 
55. Specific requests from CBI countries regarding NAFTA include: 
(a) that concessions under NAFTA which supersede those existing 
under CBI be immediately extended to CBI members; and (b) that 
access conditions to NAFTA be provided to CBI members. 
56. It was noted, however, that it was unlikely that the U.S. 
would be willing to extend the benefits of NAFTA to the Caribbean 
countries. The EAI is designed to reward those countries that are 
undergoing trade liberalization (hence, the logic of Chile as 
"next in line")• 
57. Further, it was asserted that the Caribbean countries are 
hardly being ignored by the United States. Preferential treatment 
is being provided in CBI. In addition, these countries will 
receive benefits from the Multilateral Investment Fund of the 
EAI, even when they are not IDB members, and access to financial 
resources via Puerto Rico (through the "93 6" program) is 
available to all of them. 
58. More generally, others observed that the options for small 
countries were limited. Either they sign an agreement in which 
they have no influence on or they don't sign an agreement. 
Further, with the possible exception of the CBI countries, it is 
unlikely that the U.S. will break its reciprocity principles on 
behalf of "small markets that don't count." 
(iv) CONSIDERATIONS OF DOMESTIC POLICY, PRECONDITIONS, AND TIMING 
59. The issue is not whether to liberalize, but how. And there 
are many different ways to do this. Thus, considering different 
types of liberalization becomes the critical consideration. 
60. It was recognized that many preconditions need to be 
addressed before entering an FTA. Further, it was observed that 
while it is true that the current regional integration schemes 
are different from the past (more open and rational), there still 
was a long way to go for most of the countries before they would 
be ready to join with the U.S. in an FTA. The trade barriers, 
while much lower than in times past, nevertheless remain high. 
61. There has been impressive change in attitudes and 
commitments. It's impressive, for example, that tariff reductions 
in Mercosur are now automatic. And there has been a dramatic 
change in the economic climate in LAC: domestic, foreign, and 
public confidence is back as evidenced in the financial markets. 
Mexico has followed a blueprint for success and has exceeded 
expectations. 
62. However, there is much to be done in the region as a whole. 
As regards the integration process, the complicated mix of 
signing agreements will probably eventually sort themselves out, 
but only if the commitment to opening the LAC economies becomes a 
full reality. 
63. Privatization was singled out as a necessary policy to 
accompany trade liberalization. The inadequate pace of 
privatization in some instances is a major obstacle. 
64. Market policies need to assume environmental considerations. 
"Eco-efficiency" must be an objective. Sustainable development 
need not adversely affect economic and export growth. 
65. It was argued that exchange rate policy could be used as a 
tool to provide some degree of freedom from the tendency towards 
harmonization with other economies of the region. The exchange 
rate, in other words, could serve as a shock absorber; as a 
mechanism to preserve some sovereignty and to allow differences 
in domestic policies. 
66. Participation of the private sector in negotiations and 
policy decisions is crucial. Without the private sector, after 
all, trade liberalization will amount to zero. 
67. Losers from liberalization need to be compensated. This is 
not only appropriate on moral grounds, but is also makes 
political sense. 
68. Issues of timing were much discussed. The sequence of 
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policies and conditions is important. First, macro stabilization 
must precede trade liberalization. Second, unilateral trade 
liberalization, before embarking on an FTA, is in the interest of 
any country. Third, the transition period has to start before the 
LAC country enters an FTA. 
69. There was disagreement regarding the best pace in which to 
proceed. One perspective pointed out that the process of forming 
a hemispheric FTA is a very long term proposition. And for most 
of the countries, it will be a waiting process to some extent: 
waiting for the outcome of NAFTA, and then of the Chile- U.S 
negotiations. In addition, countries will not be eligible to 
enter into negotiations until certain domestic conditions are 
met. 
70. Hence, why this sense of rush? Now is the time for intensely 
practical working groups (on DS, subsidies, intellectual 
property, services, etc.). We need a vision of where we are 
going, rather than only reactionary responses to events. 
71. There is a need for further study of many issues. One of 
these is policy sequences. What is the optimal sequence as 
regards policies towards financial liberalization vs. trade 
liberalization? Liberalization policies vs. adjustment (social) 
policies? 
72. In contrast, another perspective implied that there was a 
sense of urgency, and that the long term process will bestow its 
costs on the region. The LAC countries are in competition with 
each other for the U.S. market. Mexico has a decided advantage in 
going first. To some extent, gains for one country translate into 
costs for others. 
73. There was concern regarding how this time-consuming and 
disorderly process will affect the private sector and investment. 
74. Need for more studies? The fundamental issues are well-known. 
Domestic changes are far more important than regional trade 
integration. 
75. From the perspective of the NAFTA countries, they are fully 
aware of their hemispheric obligations (including the role of 
ALADI). Yet it is important for others to realize, that 
negotiators of NAFTA are not waiting. It seems hemispheric 
integration will proceed one way or another. While the 
discussions such as those of this colloquium are helpful, 
••integration is on us now." 
76. We can learn a lot from the European Community. They set 
dates, abide by them, and they are reasonable dates. Maybe it 
could be agreed that by 1995 a major part of the liberalization 
process could be completed. 
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(V) MÜTÜAL INTERESTS AND ROLES OF CANADA, LAC, AND THE U.S. IN A 
WKFTA 
77. Much of the discussion focused on how Canada and LAC could 
better serve their mutual interests. A central purpose was the 
promotion of a dialogue in identifying and maximizing reciprocal 
arrangements between Canada and LAC. 
78. While some of this discussion was in the context of how to 
better deal with the "elephant" in between them, it was also 
acknowledged that the United States deserves credit for taking 
the initiative of a WHFTA. A central issue then is whether this 
elephant is a rogue or is friendly. 
79. The Canadian perspective has been one of ambivalence towards 
the U.S. and FTAs. While Canadians are multilateralists at heart, 
this commitment has been tempered by events and needs. 
80. It was acknowledged that Canada has historically paid little 
attention to LAC. After the collapse of markets in the 1930s, 
Canada turned its back on LAC. This was a mistake. 
81. Ties have not been pursued in part because of the perception 
that Canadian-U.S. relations would suffer; in part because of the 
perception was that it was tough to do business with (a non-
democratic and unstable) LAC; in part because there has not 
existed adequate institutional and educational capacity to follow 
and link up with LAC. 
82. Yet the Canadians' role in LAC development can be important, 
mutual interests can be identified and pursued. For example, from 
a LAC perspective, there is much to learn from Canada's 
experience of being the most successful trader with the United 
States. Canada's high standard of living can be linked to a 
longstanding commitment to international trade and to trading 
intensively and extensively with the United States. 
83. Some possible specific roles for Canada for the hemisphere 
include: (a) facilitate the negotiation process between the U.S. 
and LAC; (b) participation more in preferential arrangements for 
the Caribbean (e.g., expand CARIBCAN into Central America); (c) 
help clarify the status of a docking clause of NAFTA; and (d) 
join ALADI. 
84. What does LAC have to offer? In terms of potential trade 
growth, presently LAC may be the most dynamic area of the world. 
Expansion of trade into the region by both the United States and 
Canada could go far towards alleviating some fundamental 
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Support to the Process of Hemispheric Trade Liberalization 
Siumnary of the Fourth Colloquium 
"Cost-Benefit Analyses at the Country and Sectoral Levels" 
Washington, D.C., July 27-28/ 1992 
1. This colloquium provided the opportunity for in depth 
discussion of several issues raised in previous meetings of the 
project. Among them: a) the scope and format of a Western 
Hemispheric Free Trade Area (WHFTA); b) the interests towards a 
WHFTA from the perspective of different Latin American countries; 
c) the harmonization of policies; d) the role of the Uruguay Round. 
2. Four country case studies were reviewed: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico. They cover a wide range of prevailing conditions 
in the region, regarding trade arrangements. At the time, Mexico 
was about to sign an FTA with Canada and the U.S.; Chile 
accomplished the most complete trade reform in Latin America; 
Brazil is not too enthusiastic about the idea of a WHFTA, but its 
participation is crucial for the success of this enterprise; and 
Argentina illustrates the case of a country that is keen to follow 
simultaneously three types of trade liberalization: unilateral, 
subregional (MERCOSUR), and regional. 
3. A general conclusion from these case studies is that the 
interests towards a WHFTA may vary according to the size, 
geography, and macroeconomic conditions of each country, but the 
nature of the costs and benefits is the same for all. It was 
characterized as a choice between the (long run) welfare gains to 
be extracted from economies of scale and scope, and the (short run) 
costs of economic restructuring . 
4. Three sessions were devoted to the impact of trade 
liberalization on industry, agriculture, and services. 
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I. COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
i) Argentina 
5= The debate on the Argentine case was based on five 
characteristics of that economy: a) three-quarters of its exports 
are based on natural resources; b) despite two decades of export 
promotion policies, the anti-export bias of the trade regime 
persisted; c) a strong tendency towards exchange rate instability; 
d) the adoption of several trade regimes; e) the obligations within 
the MERCOSUR project. 
6. Considering the fragility of economic ties between member 
countries, the welfare gains to be generated by MERCOSUR are still 
uncertain. However, if Argentina and Brazil succeed in the fight 
against inflation, MERCOSUR might become an important instrument of 
regional integration, and could pave the way for wider projects. 
ii) Brazil 
7. The discussion of the Brazilian case was organized around the 
following topics: a) Brazil-U.S. relations in the eighties; b) the 
impact of domestic economic reform on Brazil-U.S. relations; c) new 
directions in economic integration in Latin America (NAFTA, 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, MERCOSUR, Andean Pact, 
etc); d) U.S.-Brazil relations and bloc formation in the Americas. 
8. One question stimulated a lively debate: why Brazil doesn't 
export more to the U.S.? Several answers were suggested: the 
comparative advantages of the Brazilian economy; the U.S. 
protectionism; as well as the role of trade in both economies. This 
debate highlighted, once again, how critical will be these 
bilateral links within the context of a WHFTA. To be sure, the 
scope and format of the economic community to be created by the 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative will be shaped, to a great 
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extent, by the size and structure of U.S.-Brazil trade. 
9. The role of strategic trade policies was another controversial 
issue. Brazil is the only Latin American country where such 
policies would be feasible. Are they worth trying? Under what 
conditions? Brazil had, indeed, a long experience on industrial 
policy, and a major part of it met the criteria suggested by the 
literature on strategic trade policy. But, as it is well known, 
that experience was developed under the guidelines of the import 
substituting model. The problem now was described as how to resume 
it within the parameters of an open economy. 
iii) Chile 
10. Four trade policy alternatives were considered for Chile: a) 
a bilateral FTA with the U.S.; b) an FTA with MERCOSUR; c) a 
multilateral FTA with the U.S.; d) the permanence of unilateral 
trade liberalization. 
11. It was recognized that these alternatives can be 
complementary. There is growing evidence that open economies are in 
better condition to implement free trade arrangements. Although the 
most beneficial solution would be a multilateral agreement with the 
U.S., this can be achieved only in the long run. An FTA with 
MERCOSUR would be an important instrument to build a regional 
system of alliances, and to stimulate new investment flows. Perhaps 
the least interesting option is a bilateral FTA with the U.S., but 
admittedly it is the easiest to follow in the short run. 
12. A concern was expressed regarding the use of antidumping (AD) 
and countervailing (CV) duties after the establishment of an FTA. 
This subject was discussed at some length and, again, the 
importance of dispute settlement mechanisms was stressed. The model 
under consideration was Chapter 19 of the agreement signed between 
Canada and the United States. Whether U.S. negotiators are willing 
to spread the use of this mechanism throughout the continent 
remained an open question. 
iv) Mexico 
13. Five main topics were treated in the session on Mexico: a) an 
account of NAFTA negotiations; b) a brief review of the recent 
literature on quantitative assessments of NAFTA; c) the potential 
impact of NAFTA on the Mexican economy; d) free trade agreements 
and loss of sovereignty; e) NAFTA and Latin American integration. 
14. Will NAFTA become a building block of hemispheric integration? 
A major part of the discussion was centered around this issue. 
According to some participants, if the Uruguay Round establishes a 
more favorable environment for international trade, the Enterprise 
for the Americas Initiative will become less attractive for Latin 
American countries. In such a case, EAI could be confined to NAFTA. 
15. In any case, once NAFTA is signed, Mexico will have to 
reconcile it with the Montevideo Treaty, that governs those trading 
arrangements agreed within the framework of the Latin American 
Integration Association (LAIA). It is not clear yet if this will 
become just a mere formality, or if it will turn into a delicate 
political problem. 
II. SECTORAL STUDIES 
i) Industry 
16. The session on industry dealt with five main topics: a) the 
relations between trade liberalization and competition policies; b) 
the effects of globalization on intra-industry and intra-firm 
trade; c) the role of investment in the creation of dynamic 
comparative advantages; d) the impact of trade reforms on the 
profile of competitiveness of industrial sectors; e) the links 
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between trade policy and income distribution. 
17. Although trade liberalization can be a catalyst for the 
restructuring process of industries and firms, a set of 
complementary policy reforms is needed, in order to establish 
transparent rules of competition. Three types of barriers to 
efficient restructuring should be removed: those that weaken 
discipline, hinder mobility, and limit the availability of 
resources. 
18. The role of government should not be restricted to the task of 
ensuring a competitive environment in the domestic market. A major 
driving force behind trade liberalization policies is to secure the 
gains from the current globalization trends in the world economy. 
Few countries have enduring comparative advantages, since they are 
periodically reshaped by technical progress and investment 
decisions. Thus, there is a wide range of public policies to be 
implemented in the areas of basic and applied sciences, industrial 
R&D, training and management, and long run credit conditions. 
19. The Brazilian case was taken as an illustration of the 
beneficial effects of trade liberalization. Several decades of 
strong protectionism allowed the coexistence of sophisticated 
industries and highly unequal patterns of income distribution. 
However, the available evidence, based on entrepreneurial 
expectations, suggests that the majority of the industrial sector 
is prepared to face the challenge of international competition. If 
this is the case, the most relevant impact of the current trade 
reform will be a reduction in mark-ups and an expansion of the 
internal market, that will facilitate the negotiation of a free 
trade agreement within the hemisphere. 
ii) Agriculture 
20. The session on agriculture provided an overview of U.S. farm 
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policy, a brief summary of its history, and a general debate on the 
problems of this sector in Latin America. The backgroud information 
for this debate was rendered by the Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA). 
21. It was argued that EAI may offer two interesting perspectives 
for Latin American farm products: the permanent access to the U.S. 
market and the establishment of common rules and policies in the 
region. In order to achieve these goals, the harmonization of 
macroeconomic policies would be a necessary condition. 
22. It was also contended that the peculiarities of the rural 
sector may create two opposing forces within a WHFTA, one towards 
enduring protectionism, the other towards deeper integration. The 
European experience is a compelling illustration of this apparent 
paradox. 
ill) Services 
23. The discussion on services was focused on Central America, 
with particular reference to the following sectors: financial 
services, transport, information and communications, and tourism. 
The interplay between three factors were considered: a) the reform 
of the public sector in Latin America; b) the rhythm of innovations 
in data processing technology; c) the prospects of GATT negotiating 
agenda. 
24. Two perspectives were considered appropriate for the analysis 
of services in Central America, a domestic perspective and an 
international perspective. The former would be a study of supply 
and demand for services in the region, aiming to assess the local 
supply in terms of quality, availability, and competitiveness of 
different services. The latter would discuss the interests and the 
bargaining power of Central America in regard to the Uruguay Round. 
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1. The central focus of the colloquium, the actual and 
anticipated negotiation issues of hemispheric free trade 
agreements (FTAs), was placed in the context of three levels of 
activity: globally, characterized by great uncertainties, as 
recently manifested in EC currency instabilities; regionally, 
depicted by a seemingly irreversible hemispheric trend towards 
"competitive integration"; and domestically, by the "miraculous 
change" in attitudes and domestic reforms in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LAC). While regionalism is here to stay, and the 
North American FTA (NAFTA) is very much a reality, a Western 
Hemisphere FTA (WHFTA) remains hypothetical. The trade component 
of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) still remains 
"an intention." Will a WHFTA also become a reality? And how might 
it look? What will be the main negotiating issues? 
2. An underlying, secondary thread of the colloquium addressed 
anticipated effects from a WHFTA and the national interests at 
stake. The focus here was largely on two key players, the U.S. 
and Brazil. While the significance of this debate is evident in 
terms of these countries' relative economic weight in the 
Hemisphere, lessons can also be derived for other LAC countries. 
3. Characterized more by divergent perspectives than consensus, 
and more by questions raised than answered, the colloquium 
displayed how difficult and complex the current trade negotiation 
issues are. The new trade agenda goes beyond the border issues of 
tariff reductions, addressing domestic policy and ultimately 
issues of sovereignty. The nature of this agenda is a reflection 
in part of the success in prior GATT rounds of tariff reductions. 
I. National Interests 
4. As a precursor to a discussion on the negotiating issues, the 
probability and desirability of a WHFTA, particularly from the 
standpoint of the U.S. and Brazil, were addressed. Will NAFTA be 
extended? Should NAFTA be extended? 
i) ü.S. and Brazil 
5. Brazil represents approximately 50% of South America's area 
and population, 60% of its GDP, 36% of its foreign trade and 25% 
of its external debt. Brazil has probably the most diversified 
economic structure in all of LAC. Therefore, the main adjustments 
to be made and negotiation difficulties to be encountered in the 
process of forming a WHFTA would refer to the effects of an FTA 
with the U.S. for the Brazilian economy and the (much smaller) 
consequences for the U.S. economy of an FTA with Brazil. 
6. One perspective argued that the U.S. interest in 
multilateralism has been waning concomitant with its hegemonic 
power. While regionalism may be second best in theory for the 
U.S., it is first best in reality in light of the given options. 
The United States' interest in regionalism stems from its 
relations with non-hemispheric countries (a perception that trade 
opportunities abroad may be closing, and a perception that 
pursuing regionalism may actually open up some opportunities 
abroad via greater bargaining power), and from its recognition 
that there is much commerciai potential in LAC for the U.S. This 
view holds that, from the U.S. perspective, NAFTA should be 
extended into a WHFTA. 
7. A somewhat different perspective questioned the U.S. 
commitment to regionalism beyond NAFTA. U.S. commercial interests 
are located in other parts of the world, as evidenced by the 
concentration of trade and investment flows to Europe and Asia. 
Further, U.S. interests in Mexico (viewed largely as a nearby 
pool of cheap labor to compete with the Asians) are unique and 
not extendable to the rest of the Hemisphere. While NAFTA 
represents an important change of direction in U.S. foreign 
policy, it does not signify a step towards a WHFTA. In fact, the 
success of NAFTA and the success of Mexico within NAFTA may 
become more of an obstacle than a step towards establishing a 
WHFTA since Mexico may be reluctant to forego its preferential 
status with the U.S. 
8. On the Brazilian interest, one perspective held that the 
national interest of Brazil—that of committing itself to a 
WHFTA—does not coincide with the national (official) position. 
While multilateralism is more important to Brazil than to Mexico, 
Brazil cannot bring about multilateralism. (Not even the U.S. can 
do that). And Brazil can't afford to be marginalized. The share 
of processed Brazilian exports to the U.S. is relatively higher 
than to other regions, and it is one indicator of the relative 
sizeable gains to be had from focusing more on the U.S. market. 
In addition, Europe and Japan have priorities other than focusing 
on economic relations with LAC. 
9. Further, while stabilization of the Brazilian economy is a 
very important pre-requisite to integration with the U.S., a 
commitment to a WHFTA may expedite stabilization. If integration 
with the U.S. is an additional argument for the stabilization of 
Brazil, then it is a good argument. Brazil needs to "pay and 
see." 
10. Another perspective asserted that Brazil, while officially 
interested in integration with the U.S., holds a position of 
healthy skepticism; one that is concerned with preconditions. 
First, there is a need for clarification about the accession 
clause of NAFTA. Second, there is more than trade liberalization 
involved here for Brazil; in fact there may be constitutional 
constraints in such an integration scheme. In addition, it is 
unclear as to the optimal logistics between progressing with 
Mercosur and negotiating with the U.S. How does Brazil negotiate 
with the U.S., e.g., before the common external barrier of 
Mercosur is erected, or unless Mercosur is abandoned? Finally, 
there is concern over U.S. trade policy. While U.S. barriers are 
low on average, there are high tariff spikes that adversely 
affect Brazil and others (orange juice is an example). 
ii) National Interests in a Larger Context 
11. More critical conclusions emerge from yet another viewpoint, 
stemming perhaps from a more explicit treatment of the profound 
structural differences and development gaps within the 
Hemisphere. As for the U.S., the argument goes, the consumer 
markets in LAC are too small to offer any substantial aggregate 
gains from trade. In contrast, and in light of hemispheric 
demographic trends, there are tremendous incentives for U.S. 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Hemisphere, to be surely 
strengthened by a WHFTA. NAFTA, in fact, is much more than an 
FTA; it is a capital market integration process. Greater economic 
impacts of NAFTA, as well as from a WHFTA are likely to stem more 
from investment liberalization than from trade liberalization. A 
redistribution from wages to profits in LAC may be one result of 
the investment liberalization process. From the U.S. perspective, 
this will not contribute to a growth in LAC consumer markets for 
U.S. exports. 
12. As for the LAC countries, a WHFTA may unevenly distribute the 
gains and losses between countries as well as between capital and 
labor from trade and investment liberalization. There is likely 
to be a concentration of benefits in those countries that are 
currently exporting manufactures. Liberalization may only 
reinforce existing comparative advantages, increasing the 
dependency on primary products and worsening the terms of trade 
for the poorer countries of the region. An FTA could aggravate 
this trend since members are likely to lose some leverage over 
domestic industrial policies. Finally, the timing of a WHFTA from 
the standpoint of LAC exporters may be less than propitious; the 
U.S. economy is not likely to be the engine of growth in the 
1990s that it was in the 1980s. 
13. A final outlook and approach compared the effects on LAC from 
unilateral trade liberalization (apertura) with opening 
accompanied by a WHFTA. Apertura by itself, it was argued, puts 
downward pressure on domestic profits, and with overvaluation, 
tends to set in motion a vicious circle of domestic firm, closings 
from import competition, capital inflow, more overvaluation, more 
firm closings. 
14. What does WHFTA add to this? While LAC can't expect enormous 
gains from such an FTA, the result is likely to be more favorable 
when apertura is accompanied by a WHFTA than by itself. LAC can 
lock into reforms and hopefully maintain stable access to the 
U.S. market. The net effect of apertura with a WHFTA will 
hopefully result in short term costs yielding to long term gains. 
LAC has a defensive interest to get into NAFTA, as the losses 
from exclusion are great. Perhaps a third path, that of an 
export-led, intra LAC-led strategy, would be the best option. 
15. As it has been the case throughout the other colloquia, 
concern over the national interests of the small countries of the 
Hemisphere was also voiced. What should they do? What can they 
do? One reply focused on the lack of options, in contrast to such 
a country as Brazil, available to the small country. Being 
excluded from a regional FTA for a small country would have much 
greater adverse consequences than in the case of a larger 
country. From a small country's perspective, it was argued, 
joining a WHFTA is much less equivocal. 
II. Negotiating Agenda 
i) Market Access 
16. Nontariff barriers (NTBs) were the focus of the market access 
discussions including, the importance of measuring NTBs precisely 
for purposes of negotiating an orderly phasing out or down of 
NTBs (and briefly, some guidelines on how to do so); NTBs in the 
Hemisphere; the scope of NTB negotiations in NAFTA (which 
consisted of quite sophisticated blending of several techniques 
to reduce NTBs) and anticipated scope of NTB negotiations in a 
WHFTA. 
17. It was contended that, particularly in relation to the 
industrialized countries, there has been substantial reductions 
in NTBs in many LACs. Many NTBs have been swept away. Those that 
have been used for balance of payments purposes are largely no 
longer in existence. 
18. Nevertheless, many NTBs remain throughout the Hemisphere. In 
fact, three trade-specific NTBs were characterized as the 
"cutting edge of protectionism:" (a) anti-dumping (AD); (b) 
customs valuation (which can add as much as 20% to the price of 
imports); and (c) technical standards (with the interface between 
standards and the environment of particular and growing concern). 
19. Perhaps the most important NTH is AD. While the experts in 
this NTS have been the industrialized countries, AD is spreading 
and becoming ubiquitous. The economics of AD is poor. There is 
bound to be price discrimination between two markets, often 
having nothing to do with predatory activity. Hence, the injury 
test is key. 
20. An "unoriginal plea" was made to look more closely at 
safeguards as addressed by GATT as a substitute for AD. There 
will likely be growing pressures for unilateral measures as trade 
liberalization proceeds and trade frictions increase. The 
hemispheric FTAs (Canada-U.S. FTA [CUSFTA] and NAFTA) have failed 
to adequately address the tendency to resort to AD rather than 
safeguards as a safety valve mechanism. 
21. As regards concern over LAC access to U.S. markets, one 
recommendation was that unilateral trade liberalization by LAC 
countries not be undertaken; that balanced concessions be pursued 
at the least, with perhaps a transitional period in which 
asymmetry or preferential treatment towards LAC be provided. 
Unilateral liberalization, it was argued, would aggravate balance 
of payments problems for LAC economies and bring with it exchange 
rate difficulties. The reduction of barriers needs to be gradual 
and simultaneous. Otherwise, less competitive sectors in the U.S. 
will slow barrier reduction in the U.S. and create trade 
imbalances in the Hemisphere (i.e., tendencies towards trade 
deficits in LAC countries vis-a-vis the U.S.) which will have to 
be compensated by capital inflows or trade surpluses with other 
trade partners for the LAC countries. 
22. This perspective is in striking contrast to that provided by 
some in previous colloquia, who have argued that the more the LAC 
economy has followed the path of unilateral trade liberalization 
before joining an FTA, the less will be the cost of trade 
diversion. 
ii) Rules of Origin (RO) 
23. Complexity and uncertainty characterized the discussion of 
rules of origin. More questions were raised than answers 
provided. Which RO method is best? All measures appear to suffer 
from deficiencies. For example, the change in tariff heading 
method (CTH), while perhaps preferred by some trade negotiators, 
suffers from a tendency to become dated, is expensive, and it is 
plagued with customs classification problems. The value added 
measure makes it harder for less developed countries to obtain 
preferential access to an FTA since, other trends remaining the 
same, the lower the wages, the lower the value added. The ideal 
strategy, it was suggested, may be to decrease trade barriers 
overall, and consequently decrease the importance of RO. 
24. What are the consequences of RO? On the positive side, ROs 
are duty preferences and may make FTAs more politically amenable 
and hence more likely. In addition, RO decrease unnecessary 
transport costs which arise from trade deflection. 
25. On the other hand, ROs represent quotas typically implemented 
to satisfy special interests. Further, these quotas, if too 
strict, can serve as barriers not only between members and non-
members of an FTA, but between members as well. In fact perverse 
results are possible. RO that are too high might result in 
companies preferring to source outside the region and pay the 
tariffs, instead of source inside and get the preferential tariff 
rate (if local sources are too expensive and existing tariffs are 
already relatively low). Is the RO a mechanism to prevent 
regional integration from becoming global? 
26. Does the complexity and proliferation of different ROs 
necessarily inhibit trade? Or is it conceivable that with 
multiple transformation rules, there would be less trade 
diversion? Is it possible to seek RO harmonization? Is it 
desirable? To what extent has ownership, in contrast to location 
of production, become an issue? 
iii) Domestic Trade Remedies 
27. Safeguards in general and U.S. trade laws, "301" laws and the 
U.S. procedure on AD and countervailing duties (CVD) in 
particular, were the focus of the discussions. 
28. Safeguards, or temporary government actions to protect a 
domestic economy, are essentially exceptions to the rule. The 
fundamental question is how to agree on these exceptions, not 
whether there will be any. 
29. There is, however, little agreement even on the purpose of 
safeguards. Are they to facilitate adjustment (i.e., for economic 
efficiency purposes), to address distributional concerns, or to 
facilitate the negotiation process (i.e., for political 
efficiency purposes)? The third rationale may be the best. 
30. Some discussion centered on how safeguards are treated in the 
GATT, the desirability of keeping safeguards within the GATT 
framework, and the divisions that have surrounded safeguards 
within the GATT. Important issues include selectivity. 
degressivity, legitimization of gray area measures, timing, 
surveillance, and compensation. 
31. Other than the escape clause of Article XIX, there are six 
other exceptions to Article XXIV (which sanctions FTAs on three 
conditions), and include allowances for agricultural supports, 
restrictions for balance of payment purposes, and allowances for 
restrictions for health, safety, and law enforcement reasons. The 
criteria to activate the escape clause (which provides 
governments an escape from GATT obligations by allowing trade 
barriers to safeguard producers seriously injured by trade 
liberalization) have been met with much dispute and 
dissatisfaction over the interpretation. 
32. A safeguards policy of a WHFTA should aim at motivating 
acceptance of efficient structural change and compensating for 
market failure. Actual safeguard policy instruments can be judged 
on four criteria: (a) adjustment (factor reallocation in the 
right direction should be encouraged over a finite time horizon); 
(b) efficiency; (c) focus (the more narrowly focused, the fewer 
the side effects); and (d) viability (it must be politically 
palatable). 
33. There is a very difficult balance to strike between using 
safeguards to facilitate desired change vs. using safeguard-like 
instruments to obstruct desired change. There is legitimate 
concern that such instruments, rather than serving as needed 
"safety valves," be used instead to achieve "back door 
protectionism." Concern was expressed at the colloquium that the 
latter purpose may be the growing intent of the U.S. Such an 
outcome could aggravate LAC's ability to adequately address its 
foreign debt, since access to the U.S. market is critical in 
order to finance debt payments. 
34. Along similar lines, it was argued that while safeguards are 
preferable to AD and CVD actions, the latter will continue to be 
used as "safety valves" in a second best world. Here we can draw 
lessons from the U.S. International Trade Commission in terms of 
applying techniques in the determination of injury. Progress in 
developing rigorous techniques at the ITC has been palpable, and 
can be transferred elsewhere. The objective is to decrease policy 
discretion. When the methodology is deemed acceptable, the debate 
changes in focus; the controversy is found elsewhere. 
35. Finally, some discussion centered on the "301" U.S. trade 
laws. This policy represents an effort to open up markets for 
U.S. exporters, when unjustifiable or unreasonable trade 
practices, as determined by the U.S., take place among its 
trading partners. The threat of retaliation by the U.S. has been 
the enforcing mechanism. 
36. Several points were raised concerning the "301" policy. 
First, as illustrated by the example of the Argentinean export 
tax on soybean products, the determination can be made 
arbitrarily, and the outcome counterproductive from the 
standpoint of the U.S. (There tends to be a failure to look at 
the big picture; the repercussions elsewhere.). Secondly, "301" 
laws won't go away with hemispheric trade agreements. There have 
been two cases against Canada since CUSFTA. In fact, with the 
increase in trade from an FTA, one can expect greater trade 
frictions and this may increase the likelihood of greater use of 
"301" laws. This points to the need for effective dispute 
settlement, perhaps along the lines of Chapter 19 in CUSFTA. On 
the positive side, "301" laws may serve the constructive purpose 
of encouraging countries to widen the scope of negotiations. 
iv) Intellectual Property Rights 
37. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) were placed in the 
context of the evolution of trade negotiations at the GATT. It is 
a new game today, with new rules. To proceed with integration and 
further trade liberalization, we need to focus attention on the 
much more difficult issues of harmonization including the area of 
IPRs. Trade negotiations today deal with policies, not products 
as in the prior GATT rounds. 
38. Different perspectives on the role of IPRs emerged, 
underscoring that it perhaps remains one of the more divisive 
issues in trade negotiations. On the one hand, one perspective 
saw it as largely a "North vs. South issue." IPRs such as patents 
confer monopoly rights, devised to encourage creativity. Yet 
underlying all national legislation is an attempt to find a 
proper balance between the encouragement of creativity and the 
maximisation of social welfare arising from the fruits of the 
innovation. The nature and the scope of this balance is likely to 
vary per country; significant differences are likely at different 
levels of economic and technological development. 
39. Policy harmonization in the area of IPRs, the argument 
continues, implies to a large extent policy "Americanization." 
This "upward harmonization" of protection poses serious obstacles 
to the possibility of industrial development for countries at 
lower levels of technological development. A more gradual and 
flexible approach to accommodate different levels of 
technological development is needed. 
40. Another perspective saw IPRs as largely a win-win situation; 
the enforcement of such protection serves the interests of any 
country interested in development. Intellectual property should 
be viewed as an input to development, as part of any economy's 
infrastructure, rather than a barrier to trade. Human resource 
development is greatly reduced without this protection because 
companies are less inclined to invest. 
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41. Examples were provided throughout LAC, from software, to 
apples, to cut flowers, of the need to protect results so as to 
stimulate research and innovation. Of all of LAC, only Mexico, it 
was argued, has reached an intellectual property infrastructure 
threshold sufficient to stimulate technical innovation and 
facilitate technology transfers. 
42. While there may be much more hope for harmonization of 
intellectual property systems, as levels of development in the 
region harmonize, an argument was made that convergence rather 
than harmonization is the appropriate approach towards IPRs at 
this time. 
43. The importance of institution building and of increasing the 
capacity of countries to enforce IPRs was underscored. A 
harmonized or convergent system will be undermined, if countries 
do not have the capacity to enforce the rights. 
V) Trade in Services 
44. The discussion on trade in services revealed diversity, 
complexity, and controversy. So diverse are services and so 
predominant in most economies, that to aggregate them all by 
referring to them as a sector is misleading. The range in 
complexity of services (and their implications on the quality of 
employment) is wide, from housekeeping to computer services. 
45. Equally misleading is the tendency to conceptually separate 
services from goods. The myth of the economic development theory 
of the evolution from primary to secondary to tertiary "sectors" 
has been dispelled in the 1980s. The new technological paradigm 
establishes a close (and simultaneous) relation between goods and 
services. 
46. Trade liberalization in services in the Hemisphere raises 
important issues of specialization. The U.S. has a clear 
comparative advantage in services associated with advanced 
technology. How then can we prevent integration from inhibiting 
development of such services in LAC? Liberalization could mean 
that LAC be relegated to users of services, rather than 
developers. Similarly, a division of labor in services could 
result in a LAC specialization in low-wage, low-skill services 
that have traditionally been nontradeables. This specialization, 
however, would necessitate migration of LAC labor to the U.S., 
and would not be acceptable to either side. 
47. Tampering with hemispheric specializations in services raised 
the concern that LAC would be taking a step backward, to import-
substitution again, though in services this time rather than 
goods. The effects from such policy may again be perverse. It was 
argued, in response to this concern, that selective protection 
rather than indiscriminate protection is the choice. 
48. Some of the discussions focused on particular types of 
services, specifically trade issues in telecommunications and 
financial services. Telecommunication services, alongside 
telecommunication goods, serve the critical role of a "highway" 
or infrastructure for other economic services. Trade 
liberalization in telecommunications services and goods 
necessarily include domestic policy issues of government 
procurement and competition policy. The importance of 
transparency and non-discrimination in any liberalization effort 
was stressed. Where competition is allowed, an independent 
regulatory agency is crucial. 
49. Discussions of trade liberalization in financial services 
addressed the types of financial barriers that exist in the 
Hemisphere; U.S. liberalization objectives; possible costs and 
benefits from such liberalization; a possible role for the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and other policy 
considerations when liberalizing financial services, particularly 
the appropriate sequencing of policies. 
50. Some benefits from trade liberalization in financial services 
would presumably stem from the resulting increased pressures of 
competition. On the other hand, there was concern whether some 
small financial sectors in LAC could withstand the competition. 
There is a risk that opening up may lead to instability in 
investments and in exchange rates. Trade liberalization in 
financial services may lead to large and unstable capital flows 
and create balance of payments problems. Safeguard provisions may 
be needed, particularly for the small country. 
51. The sequencing of liberalization may be critical. Should 
domestic financial liberalization be a pre-requisite to trade 
liberalization in financial services? Is there a correct policy 
sequence between financial liberalization in general (i.e., 
within as well as across borders) and trade liberalization in 
other goods and services? Or should they and can they be 
addressed simultaneously? 
52. One position has argued that domestic financial deregulation 
should precede liberalization of trade, so as to reduce the 
likelihood of a net outflow of capital in search of higher 
interest rates abroad. Another perspective held quite adamantly 
during the discussions that financial liberalization should never 
precede trade liberalization. The risk of opening up the 
financial sector first is too high. Witness the effects of 
financial liberalization in Mexico and Argentina where large 
volumes of short-term capital have contributed to overvalued 
exchange rates and large trade deficits. In LAC, investors are 
not protected as they are in the U.S. Some LAC stock markets are 
greatly overvalued, and are susceptible to large devaluations. 
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The goal should be to attract long-term investment, not 
speculative short-term capital, in order to strengthen the 
balance of payments. 
vi) Labor and Trade 
53. The skepticism of U.S. labor towards NAFTA was placed in the 
context of some dismal U.S. labor market trends. Real wages in 
the U.S. have been declining over the past two decades. 
Disaggregated, only the postgraduate labor market in the U.S. is 
doing better in real wage terms, albeit marginally, since 1973. 
Real wages for college graduates have decreased by 10%; for high 
school graduates by 20%; for pre-high school by 25%. These trends 
have been masked in two ways: the growth of two-worker 
households; and an increase in household debt. Added to this is 
the trend that there has been essentially no job growth in the 
past four years in the U.S. 
54. A fundamental concern is that these trends will be reinforced 
or accelerated as a result of NAFTA as it stands and possibly 
from a WHFTA. The NAFTA debate has been forward looking, without 
adequate assessments on labor of the ongoing liberalization 
efforts in Mexico and of the impacts from CUSFTA. As negotiated, 
while carefully crafted to protect certain interests, NAFTA 
speaks to only certain types of U.S. workers; that is, 
professionals. 
55. The role and importance of LAC labor movements with a focus 
on South American labor relations was addressed. Lessons from the 
EC and the European trade union movements can help shape a 
positive agenda for labor unions in the Hemisphere in a WHFTA. 
56. Is there some combination of provisions that is acceptable to 
labor in the U.S. and Canada that would ensure their support for 
future FTAs, or are these agreements always doomed to opposition 
from North American labor? Doomed was the conclusion of one 
perspective. This was based on an assessment that the "wish list" 
of U.S. and Canadian labor implied major long-term (and 
unattainable) changes from NAFTA as it stands. 
57. How effective will this opposition be? This was answered in 
part by addressing the evolution of the effectiveness of North 
American labor in FTAs from the U.S.-Israel FTA, to CUSFTA, to 
NAFTA. The growing strength of labor's influence is in part a 
function of the perception among labor that there has been more 
to lose. In the future, North American labor's influence will 
largely hinge on three aspects: (a) who the future FTA candidates 
are (opposition will be easier to organize if the candidate's 
exports currently face substantial barriers in the U.S. and 
Canada); (b) the extent to which NAFTA will negatively affect 
U.S. and Canadian employment; and (c) the administrations in 
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power in the U.S. and Canada (opposition will be greater if a 
Democrat is President or a Liberal is Prime Minister, in which 
case the unions cannot afford to fail in the eyes of their 
membership). 
58. Discussion emerged regarding the extent to which the issues 
raised by labor should be included in trade pacts. While these 
issues are paramount, gains from trade come from differences, 
including differences in labor conditions. Do we want to dictate 
labor conditions across countries, or would it not be better to 
leave some issues to domestic policies? 
59. One response: yes, it is in our interests to dictate labor 
standards for the same reason that it is done between states in 
the U.S. (which after all began as a free trade zone), namely to 
avoid harmonization at the lowest common denominator. Another 
reaction: we trade economists tend to think we can wall off 
things. It is not just an FTA that we are talking about here; the 
process of hemispheric integration has in fact opened up a 
pandora's box. We would be better served to at least think about 
these "nontrade" issues more as they do in Europe and in the 
Mercosur countries. 
vii) Environment and Trade 
60. This round table focused primarily on impacts and 
perspectives as regards the inter-relationship between 
environmental concerns and trade liberalization. 
61. The nature of the impacts reviewed was twofold: effects of 
the environment on trade; the repercussions of trade 
liberalization on the environment. As regards the former, 
empirical work provides little evidence that trade patterns and 
comparative advantages are significantly influenced by 
differences in pollution and environmental standards. 
62. As regards the latter, some discussion centered on the merits 
of "trickle-down environmentalism": the hypothesis that trade 
liberalization can beneficially affect the environment since more 
resources will be available from freer trade to address 
environmental concerns. 
63. One position held that the two must be addressed 
simultaneously; that sequencing—efficiency first, environmental 
projects second—is not viable. One means to address them 
simultaneously is through incentive structures, through prices. 
One rule of thumb: natural resources are consistently 
undervalued. Social prices tend to be higher than the actual 
market prices of these resources. If these resources were valued 
at their real (social) opportunity costs, economic activity could 
be more compatible with sustainable development. 
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64. This raises the need to be able to more rigorously measure 
the value of natural resources; at the least, a definition of 
acceptable levels of natural resource expenditures. One related 
consideration espoused was the formation of a multilateral group 
of scientists so as to better obtain objectivity in decisions 
regarding the interface between environment and trade, and as a 
means to minimize the risk of using environmental issues as NTBs. 
65. At least two perspectives emerged from the discussions on the 
role of FTAs on environmental issues. First, trade negotiations 
over the years have successfully reduced tariffs and are now 
encountering much more difficult issues. These issues are not 
going to go away. In fact, if they are not adequately addressed, 
trade pacts will be blocked. New rules, new treaties, new 
mechanisms will be required. And labor and environmentalists will 
have to be represented. 
66. The environmental issues are the most contentious and the 
most fiercely fought about. There is a growing interest and 
militancy among U.S. non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Environmental groups are lining up on either side, yet those that 
are the most effective in lobbying tend to be against NAFTA. 
67. A second perspective expressed caution and concern about 
overloading FTAs. The extent to which FTAs should include 
"nontrade" issues remains a very important unresolved issue. 
Several guidelines can help: (a) there is a limited role for 
trade measures in addressing nontrade issues; (b) other tools are 
available to achieve the same objectives; (c) the more targeted 
the tool, oftentimes the more effective; (d) unilateral is less 
desirable than multilateral; (e) a carrot is preferable to a 
stick. 
68. At any rate, either the high point or the low point depending 
on one's perspective, has been reached in this Hemisphere 
regarding the debate on trade and the environment. The intensity 
of the debate will not be as great as it has been in the case of 
NAFTA to date. 
69. A final, albeit very important observation during the 
discussions. The debate has focused largely on Northern defined 
perspectives. What should the negotiation agenda be as regards 
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"Macroeconomic Issues" 
(1) M. Klein, Tufts University* 
(2) L. Taylor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology* 
(3) K. Cannings, University of Montreal* 
(4) K. Jameson, University of Utah 
(5) A. Velasco, New York University 
Chair: R. McKinnon, Stanford University 
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(1) D. Chudnovsky, CENIT, Argentina* 
(2) F. Stefano Erber, IPEA, Brazil* 
(3) C. Bradford, OECD, France 
(4) A. Aninat; World Trade Center Santiago, Chile 
Chair: R. O. Lawson, IDB 
16:45 Closing Remarks 
17:00 Liaison Committee Meeting 
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Introduction 
This was the last colloquium in a series of six. Whereas the 
previous forums focused mostly on costs and benefits and the 
negotiation issues, this colloquium centered on how hemispheric 
trade liberalization can and should be brought about. Again 
framed in the current global economic context (much of which 
provides scant basis for optimism and support), the issues of 
transition discussed included the paths to integration, 
institutional considerations, necessary policies (macro and 
micro, immediate and longer-term), and the relationship between 
the private and public sectors. 
A transition to a wider hemispheric free trade agreement 
(FTA) remains a hypothetical exercise without a U.S. commitment. 
Hence, in this vein, considerable analysis also focused on U.S. 
trade policy; past, present, and future. 
Paths to Integration 
The hemisphere is characterized by fuzzy sets of overlapping 
integration groups that make it virtually impossible to clearly 
see through the maze. Nevertheless, we must attempt to sort 
things out, and there are some guidelines to follow in this 
endeavor. 
First, we have to be willing to set priorities in the short 
to medium term, and in particular, between subregional 
integration and hemispheric integration. Integration widening 
should not occur to the exclusion of deepening. Nevertheless, a 
certain degree of trade-off between the two is unavoidable as the 
larger the number of FTA partners, the lower will be the level of 
commitment. 
Laggards should not be allowed to slow the process. Some 
countries are ready to move faster than others, and they should 
not be penalized because others are not ready. On the other hand, 
care must be taken not to unduly penalize those countries that 
may be at least temporarily excluded from any free trade 
arrangement perhaps because they are not yet prepared. The costs 
of exclusion can be high, and provisions should be attempted to 
minimize this. 
There are now essentially two paths to take towards a 
Western Hemispheric Free Trade Agreement (WHFTA). One is to 
expand the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) through 
its accession clause. 
As it stands, NAFTA does not preclude countries outside the 
hemisphere from joining. There was little consensus during the 
colloquium on the merits of this policy. One argument held that 
an open accession clause would best facilitate a multilateral 
track for the world trading system. It is not in the interest of 
any countries of the hemisphere to preclude relations with 
countries outside the hemisphere. 
Another perspective felt that preference should be given to 
the hemisphere; such an arrangement need not create a defensive 
bloc, as barriers to countries outside the hemisphere can 
simultaneously be lowered. An FTA by definition is a preferential 
agreement as long as at least one country is excluded. At issue 
is what criteria are to be used to extend the preferences of 
NAFTA. 
The second, arguably better way towards hemispheric trade 
liberalization is to allow subregions to deepen first among 
themselves, and then connect via association agreements. The 
model here may be the European experience between the European 
Community (EC) and the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA). Such 
an approach would allow different groups of countries to 
integrate in preferred and feasible means. For example, the 
possibility of deepening is greater in NAFTA than among the 
countries in the Andean Pact or in Central America. 
If this latter path is the route taken, or, perhaps more 
realistically, some combination of the two occurs, then clearly 
it is not likely that the end-result will in fact be one FTA. It 
may, nevertheless, be helpful to think of a WHFTA as the "limit" 
and attempt to proceed by approaching the limit, preferably 
without prejudicing the subregional schemes. 
Institutions 
Institutional needs were much debated and without consensus. 
The lack of consensus may have hinged in part on different views 
of what institutionalization entails. 
One side of the debate recommended restraint in the types 
and the number of institutions at least for now. Let's not create 
institutions until their functions are clearly defined and needs 
are clearly demonstrated. Form before function. The Latin America 
and Caribbean (LAC) countries have suffered in the past from the 
"syndrome of the rooster"; from "singing too early." We tried to 
imitate the EC structure in part by creating permanent 
secretariats. Now times have changed. Permanent secretariats are 
no longer found in the hemisphere. And this may be a promising 
trend. Perhaps we have learned from our mistakes. 
Further, it was contended that to a large extent, 
institutional needs follow from the integration path chosen. If 
expanding NAFTA is to be the primary route, then a large 
secretariat may be needed. If the second option is pursued, the 
institutional needs are quite different. We wouldn't need this 
large mass in the center. Each subregion could go with its 
existing institutional mechanisms. This implies that it may be 
premature to talk about institutions at this time. 
Another perspective held that institutionalization may be 
needed to sustain an idea; the Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative (EAI) in particular. 
There is a huge dead whale in our midst, this argument goes. 
Its death is so recent that it doesn't yet smell, and, hence, is 
not particularly detectable. The EAI died on November 3. It was 
nothing more than a speech; an idea that was never 
institutionalized. While Clinton seems to endorse extending NAFTA 
to the hemisphere, institutionalization of this idea would give 
it some permanency as well as momentum. 
Form following function is good advice. Yet, this does not 
imply institutional considerations are premature. There is no 
mystery to what some of the functions are to be. We have enough 
of a strategy to move on this. The Multilateral Investment Fund 
(MIF) was floated before the idea clearly crystallized. Why do we 
need to know exactly what we are going to do before we do it? 
Institutionalization can be incremental. 
Some specific issues which may require institutionalization 
include the following. First, the labor and environment 
commissions of NAFTA may be important enough to be given separate 
secretariats, and hence serve as building blocs. Second, there 
may be a need for an analytical clearinghouse to sort out 
possible inconsistencies between subregional schemes. The OAS, 
and in particular its newly-formed trade committee, the Special 
Committee on Trade [SCT], could capably serve in this capacity, 
it was argued. 
Third, institutional means to facilitate hemispheric FTA 
decision making processes may be advisable. Why should the three 
countries of NAFTA make all the decisions? Fourth, harmonization 
needs to be studied (capital market harmonization, exchange rate 
issues, etc.)- Fifth, analysis regarding how to relate 
hemispheric trade agreements to the G7 countries is also needed. 
Finally, a recently released Inter-American Dialogue plenary 
report was cited as providing support for some of these 
institutional needs. The report, endorsed by many, argues that 
either a new institution or greater use and perhaps coordination 
of existing institutions (the IDB, ECLAC, and/or OAS) should be 
tapped to address the hemispheric trade issues. 
The U.S. perspective differed with respect to the "dead 
whale." Support in the current Bush administration for the EAI, 
it was argued, is widespread. Some institutionalization has 
occurred in the three-pillared initiative. There is a political 
commitment as well as momentum. The MIF is up and running. From 
the trade pillar, framework agreements have resulted with all 
countries in the hemisphere that are interested (that is, all but 
Cuba, Haiti, and Suriname). These have resulted in regular 
bilateral meetings between the U.S. and LAC countries which are 
scheduled to continue throughout the next year. The purpose of 
these meetings is to routinize the relationship so that disputes 
can be resolved in a normal way. We have never had this before in 
the hemisphere, and this in itself is a notable accomplishment. 
Furthermore, on the basis of Clinton's remarks, and of how trade 
policy works in the U.S., we can expect some continuity in the 
priorities of the U.S. government with respect to its commitment 
to the Uruguay Round, NAFTA, and to the basic principles of the 
EAI. 
One observer nevertheless argued that the EAI never took 
root in the USTR and in Commerce (in contrast to the U.S. 
Treasury). Another argued that what may have started in the U.S. 
has now a momentum of its own in the hemisphere, irrespective of 
U.S. commitment. It is no longer a Bush or even a U.S. 
initiative. Let's be clear that we're talking about an enterprise 
of the Americas and not for the Americas. 
U.S. Trade Policy 
The U.S. commitment to a WHFTA was placed in a wider context 
in discussions regarding the evolution of U.S trading relations. 
Will the largely liberal-leaning U.S. trade policy be maintained? 
What lessons can be drawn from the past? 
The consensus seemed to be that the U.S.' relatively free 
trade policy will continue. This policy falls somewhere between 
the historically-rooted protectionist stance of the distant past 
(pre-WWII), and the more ideologically pure free trade position 
of the U.S. at the outset of WWII. 
Opposing dynamics make any forecasting tenuous. On the one 
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hand, certain political and economic forces are tending to fuel 
protectionist pressures. Institutional aspects may effectively 
counteract these influences. Ideology enters into the picture as 
well, though with no clear effect in light of the contradictory 
roots of the "American Creed." 
The cold war, it was argued, played an important role in 
stimulating the free trade perspective in the United States. With 
the cold war over, some protectionist pressures are resurfacing. 
Some of these pressures are coming from labor, though labor's 
stance has not always been protectionist. 
The changing U.S. economic position is also contributing to 
the more aggressive and sometimes more protectionist pressures 
from the U.S. that we are seeing today: aggressive unilateralism; 
efforts to extend trade policy beyond the borders (the structural 
impediments initiative perhaps epitomizing this trend); demands 
for a "level playing field." Not all of these developments are 
felt to be protectionist by some. One analyst argued, for 
example, that the U.S. 301 laws have on balance been 
liberalizing. 
At any rate, it was asserted that we are living at the end 
of an era. The GATT up until the Uruguay Round attempted a 
relatively shallow form of integration. That era is passing, 
partly driven by the increasingly vulnerable economic position of 
the United States. Specifically: (1) The standard of living in 
the U.S. is converging with (and in some cases being surpassed 
by) other industrial market economies. (2) The globalization of 
the U.S. economy continues; the U.S. is now the largest recipient 
of foreign investment. (3) The U.S. faces a fundamental growth 
problem. A turning point in this respect occurred in the early 
1970s. From the outset of WWII and until 1973, productivity 
increased by 2 percent. Since then, it has increased by 1 
percent. Added to this slow down has been a general living beyond 
one's means in the 1980s. The result is an economy that is 
laboring under great constraints, and with a growth potential of 
only 1 3/4 percent. 
These economic developments have affected the way U.S. 
policy makers view regionalism. While the U.S. supported 
regionalism in the past—encouraging the beginnings of the EC, 
for example—until recently, the U.S. has felt little need to 
join in. With the decline in U.S. competitiveness, this 
perspective has changed. 
By the 1980s, it was clear that multilateralism was not 
going to redress the global trade imbalances. In part because of 
the difficulties encountered in the Uruguay Round, the U.S. began 
to pursue a multi-track strategy by turning increasingly towards 
unilateralism, bilateralism, and regionalism. The 1980s were 
characterized by an explosion of anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty cases and the initiation of a chain of FTAs beginning with 
Israel= The advantages of bilateralism and regionalism to the 
U.S. are clear. Here the rules are more to the U.S.' liking, as 
greater political leverage on the part of the U.S. can be 
exercised. A deeper form of integration than is possible in the 
multilateral forum can also be pursued. 
What is so significant about NAFTA is that the deeper form 
of integration is taking place between countries of such 
different levels of development. Here the invitation of complete 
and mutual access is a much greater challenge and requires a much 
greater compromise of national sovereignty. 
Institutional considerations are also important variables in 
the equation. In particular, certain institutional aspects are 
critical towards understanding why the U.S. has maintained its 
liberal leaning trade policy. 
United States trade policy has always been based on a 
certain tension between the legislative and the executive 
branches. Trade policy has largely been congress' prerogative yet 
the executive branch's domain. 
A critical turning point in this relationship resulted from 
the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Act when the locus of trade policy 
decision making was shifted from the legislature to the executive 
branch. This delegation of authority, eleven times renewed, has 
always been undertaken with the recognition that the executive 
branch has the greater capability to address trade policy, and to 
take the hard decisions that congress does not want to take. The 
executive (and the USTR in particular) has also had the greater 
ideological commitment towards free trade. 
This procedural consensus between the two branches, with the 
USTR serving as the focal point of pressure, remains largely 
intact today, though somewhat battered. The "fast track" 
authority is the latest variant of this arrangement. 
Another consideration is how the congress as an institution 
has evolved. In particular, there has been a decentralization of 
power among its members. No longer are the decisions made largely 
by a handful of highly influential individuals. With a less 
cohesive congress, its effectiveness vis-a-vis the executive may 
have waned. 
It is also important to understand that there exists a 
broader mix of influences on U.S. trade policy than ever before. 
Important roles are played by the media, the private sector and 
sectoral interests, and by think tanks. 
What lies ahead? We elaborate on two aspects raised during 
the colloquium. 
First, partisanship is a "muted sub-theme" in U.S. trade 
policy which could play a role as the White House changes hands. 
With the support from labor, democrats are more inclined to be 
protectionist than republicans. Nevertheless, it was argued that 
Clinton will likely continue the existing policy patterns with 
respect to NAFTA, the Uruguay Round, and aggressive unilateralism 
(section 301 in particular). That is, the liberal-leaning multi-
track route will likely continue. Clinton may not give as much 
attention to hemispheric trade as did Bush in light of his more 
ambitious (domestic) agenda, but we should not expect any radical 
departure from the largely favorable status quo of U.S. trade 
policy. 
Second, what are the chances that NAFTA will be extended? 
While an economic rationale may exist among members to limit 
further membership (so as not to dilute the benefits), the 
reality is that regionalism tends to have a dynamic which brings 
in nonmembers. This may be because the outside pressures to get 
in are so great; the cost of exclusion so high. 
Domestic and International Complementary Policy Considerations 
Domestic and international economic policy are two blades of 
a pair of scissors. If both are not adequately pursued, the 
scissors will not cut. The focus of attention during the 
colloquium, though not exclusively so, was on accompanying 
domestic policy. The policy considerations were roughly grouped 
into three types differentiated by time frame: (1) preparation 
policies; (2) policies to help sustain and maintain an FTA; and 
(3) longer term actions. Within these groups, there are both 
macro and micro considerations. 
(1) Preparation Policies 
Unless certain macro and micro conditions are in place, 
there will be no transition to anything like free trade. The 
macroeconomic conditions have been widely debated and have 
received fairly widespread consensus. Many of these in fact make 
up what has come to sometimes be referred to as the "Washington 
consensus" and refer essentially to stabilization policies, 
including fiscal discipline, tax reform, competitive exchange 
rates, and unilateral trade liberalization. 
Exchange rate policy in particular received much attention 
during the colloquium. One observer argued that no small open 
country can keep stable exchange rates unless it participates in 
capital controls or in an international exchange rate regime. 
Yet, it was also contended that while fixed exchange rates 
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can benefit and help promote integration (in part by facilitating 
trade, removing uncertainty, and helping to promote macroeconomic 
stabilization), the outcome ultimately depends on the credibility 
of the exchange rate regime itself which must be a part of a 
broader strategy. And if maintaining fixed exchanges rates is not 
feasible—a likely scenario for most LAC countries largely due to 
relatively high inflation rates—then attempting to do so may be 
counterproductive. A crawling peg to the U.S. dollar may be a 
good intermediate stage. 
There was little agreement in the discussions which focused 
on the importance of the stability of exchange rates versus the 
level of exchange rates. It was observed, at any rate, that the 
empirical investigations have not revealed strong links between 
the effects of exchange rate volatility on trade. 
The good news regarding the macroeconomic preconditions is 
that many countries in the region are making important strides 
towards meeting the objectives. With Brazil typically being the 
salient exception, real exchange rates have increased uniformly 
and dramatically, fiscal deficits have decreased substantially, 
foreign reserves are high and rising, interest rates are positive 
and attractive to foreign capital, tariffs have decreased 
dramatically, and inflation is decreasing, with rates converging 
among countries. 
While progress has been made on these fronts, much more is 
needed. In fact, some of the perceived gains from these policies 
may stem from temporary or special circumstances. This is 
particularly germane to the fiscal variable. Some of the 
increases in government revenue, for example, have come about 
from one-shot privatizations and/or creative accounting. More 
importantly, while government spending has been successfully 
curtailed, this can only be temporary, as medium term needs such 
as physical and human infrastructure and social safety nets will 
eventually need to be addressed. 
While macroeconomic preconditions are important, they are 
not enough. More attention needs to be given to microeconomic 
policies. A fundamental objective should be the promotion of a 
balanced rural development in sync with open economy oriented 
growth. 
Similarly, greater attention to the local private sector, 
the small and medium-size companies in particular, is merited. 
The local private sector will have to survive and benefit if 
trade liberalization is to take root. Local companies need to 
start to analyze anticipated effects from trade liberalization 
and assess the options and opportunities that exist. These 
options may include seeking a partnership from abroad or 
importing some inputs previously produced domestically. In a 
closed market, there tends to be an incentive to diversify. In an 
open market, the optimum strategy may be to specialize. 
On the criteria for entering into an FTA with the U.S. 
If the means to move towards a system of hemispheric free 
trade is through NAFTA, then the standards to be used must be 
negotiated and approved by all NAFTA parties. The following is a 
list of elements that the United States considers most important: 
(1) a phase out of all tariffs as required by GATT; 
(2) eventual elimination of NTBs; 
(3) broad-scale market access for services; 
(4) standards for treatment of investment: providing 
"national treatment", access to international arbitration, 
eliminating trade-related investment measures (TRIMS); 
(5) provisions for intellectual property rights; 
(6) special provisions may be necessary to deal with trade 
and investment in natural resources and resource-based products 
in light of the extensive state regulation; 
(7) operational, security and technical rules such as rules 
of origin, public health and safety exceptions, safeguards, 
dispute settlement provisions, and mechanisms for adding or 
"docking" future FTAs will be necessary; and 
(8) provisions will be needed to restrain government action 
that could undermine the agreement, such as subsidies, state 
trading, restraints justified on balance of payment grounds, and 
the use of foreign exchange restriction and controls. 
Are these tough standards? That's for the LAC countries to 
decide. An FTA is an extraordinary relationship, not ordinary. 
Don't expect what is extraordinary to become ordinary. 
The United States views the process of expanding NAFTA as a 
self-selection process. The U.S. is not giving out numbers; it's 
up to the LAC countries. Nor does the U.S. have a preference over 
whether the negotiations are with individual countries or groups 
of countries. Currently, however, only Chile is able to meet 
these standards. 
(2) Medium Term Policies 
Medium term policies refer in large part to those ongoing 
actions presumably after the signing of an FTA which are 
necessary to sustain and maintain beneficial effects from such an 
agreement. Of primary importance in this regard, are efforts to 
minimize the transition costs and adverse distributional 
consequences of freer trade. This makes sense on moral grounds, 
and is critical if free trade is to become a political winner, as 
well as a sensible economic choice. 
Adjustment assistance programs need renewed attention. They 
are politically and (in the immediate term at any rate) 
economically difficult. But we haven't put our best efforts 
towards them yet. 
Radical changes in foreign aid need to be considered. More 
nontraditional channels—and in particular aid in the form of 
trade assistance—should be pursued. This would be more 
politically acceptable in the developed countries, provide a more 
active role for the LAC countries, and prove less confrontational 
than much of the existing forms of aid transfers. 
The concerned "voice of the small country" 
It was observed that the impact from opening up an economy 
will differ according to circumstances and country. Further 
opening is not always viable. The smaller the economy relative to 
its future FTA partners, it was argued, the more difficult the 
opening process will be. It may be the case that the relatively 
smaller the country, the more there is to gain in the long run, 
though also the more disruptive is the process of getting there. 
This may indicate the need for adjustment assistance, and perhaps 
a longer transition period for the smaller country. 
On a more concrete level are the policy implications from 
the "Mexico threat" and NAFTA for the CBI countries. These 
countries, it was argued, are not yet ready to open up or to 
engage in full reciprocity. Similarly, they are unable to fully 
comply with the recent conditions set forth by the USTR. In fact, 
it is incumbent on the NAFTA countries to give consideration to 
the detrimental effects caused by investment diversion in the 
region. Assessments regarding the extent to which investment 
diversion has already occurred, however, vary widely. 
At any rate, a specific consideration put forth was the 
creation of an association agreement between CBI and NAFTA, 
whereby preferential treatment among the CBI countries would be 
maintained. In light of the potentially dire consequences for the 
CBI countries of being excluded from NAFTA, there will be strong 
pressures to provide some recompense. The marginal costs to the 
U.S. will be so small that political opposition may be relatively 
light. 
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(3) Considerations for Long Term Stability and Growth 
It was observed that the LAC countries are susceptible to 
policy asymmetry: greater focus on short term and medium term 
needs to the neglect of the longer term. Much attention during 
the colloquium was devoted to the role of the LAC state and its 
relationship with the private sector in the context of an open 
economy. How much should and can the state intervene to assist in 
achieving long term development goals? How can trade 
liberalization, particularly in the context of an FTA, be made 
compatible with industrial policy as well as competition policy? 
What role can and should state enterprises play in the 
integration process? 
A fundamental dilemma surfaced from discussions. On the one 
hand, it was acknowledged that the markets must continue to play 
a greater decision making role in the LAC economy; that the 
private sector not be burdened with government. Privatization can 
be a productive process. This would seem to imply a lesser role 
for government than in the past. 
Yet, it was also asserted that the LAC state is confronted 
with a much broader agenda now, and that an active government 
role is critical towards maintaining an open economy. The 
private sector cannot reflect the national interest. It is the 
government which must be the leading agent and the negotiator. 
Some argued that the size of the government must increase to 
fulfill this agenda. In fact, those LAC economies which have been 
most successful in opening up (Chile and Mexico in particular) 
have strong and expanding governments. It is nonsense, it was 
argued, to say the LAC state needs to shrink. Where this has 
occurred, a crisis has been the result. 
A somewhat different position held that a strong government 
need not imply a large and growing government. A change in 
priorities and focus is the answer. One argued, for example, that 
decentralization of the public sector should be an important 
objective. Another participant envisioned a lean catalytic role 
for the state rather than the directly productive role of the 
past. This would include a greater concern for the long run: 
encouraging investment in human capital, physical infrastructure, 
and science and technology, as well as better addressing 
environmental and social aspects. Self-financing public policies 
need to be stressed. 
Another theme emphasized was the importance of moving 
hemispheric trade liberalization into sync with the GATT. The 
importance of simultaneously strengthening the GATT, concluding 
the Uruguay Round, and looking at a "GATT-Plus WHFTA" strategy 
was also discussed. The possibility of simultaneously pursuing 
both regionalism and multilateralism was called into question. 
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One proposal for "GATT-Plus" was the adoption of a good 
safeguards policy, and in particular, one that is sanctioned by 
GATT, where the costs from the safeguard provisions are borne by 
the country implementing the policy. 
Other Hicroeconomic Issues 
The role of the transnational corporation (TNC) and 
implications from its prevalence in the hemisphere were 
addressed. A thesis was put forth that the nature of the 
industrial structure in the hemisphere may not be compatible with 
a hemispheric FTA. The industrial structure logic of NAFTA may 
not work for WHFTA. What we have are two major markets in the 
hemisphere: one in North America; one in South America. Both are 
characterized by "integrated regional production" (IRP), which 
creates a political necessity for "protection against protection" 
but only in a regional setting. Rather than being complementary, 
the production processes in the two regions compete. Hence, 
unless there is an overriding political incentive to push for a 
WHFTA, such a progression may be hindered by IRP. 
The IRP thesis provoked much debate and little consensus. 
Clearly other variables enter into the equation. Integration is 
not just integrated production. One argued, for example, that the 
harmonization of standards is where the devil lies. Another 
observer questioned the applicability of the thesis, which 
derives from a case study of the automobile industry, to other 
industries and production processes. IRP was also questioned in 
light of the strong political support throughout the hemisphere 
to participate in some sort of WHFTA. 
Implications from the prevalence of TNCs on trade 
liberalization were addressed in another session and in another 
light. Several working hypotheses were advanced. One, short run 
adjustments from trade liberalization are likely to be far 
stronger by virtue of the existence of TNCs. Second, there is 
likely to be growing concentration of economic activity across 
countries in the hemisphere in the short run from TNC activity in 
response to FTAs. The largest countries—U.S., Mexico, Brazil— 
probably stand to benefit the most from TNC investments in the 
short run. Over the longer term, however, TNC activity may result 
in a counter-acting diffusion of benefits across countries. 
Nevertheless, TNCs will try to play off state policies as trade 
liberalization proceeds, hence increasing the likelihood of 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies among states in their bids to 
attract foreign capital. 
In addition, it is important to directly address the policy 
implications stemming from the prevalence of TNCs in the 
hemisphere. This has scarcely been done in the context of the FTA 
debates. In particular, the policy repercussions from the 
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existence of transnational networks are many, and include the 
effects of transfer pricing on the state's ability to tax, the 
ability to measure domestic content, and to apply anti-subsidy 
and anti-dumping duties inside the FTA. 
Other Hacroeconomic Issues 
Some discussions centered on various macroeconomic 
considerations stemming from trade liberalization, many based on 
country experiences. 
One perspective provided some skepticism in this regard. On 
the basis of trade liberalization experiences, it was argued, one 
can conclude that the potential gains from a WHFTA as depicted by 
orthodox theory may likely be overstated for at least two 
reasons. Trade liberalization may not only be of secondary 
importance (to the macroeconomic effects which have typically 
dwarfed trade policy), it may also be destabilizing. Further, the 
East Asian experience has not been a fully liberalizing 
experience by any measure. In fact, historically, the nations 
that have entered into long-term economic growth under fully 
liberalized trade (and other) policy regimes constitute an empty 
set—a fact that perpetually eludes the mainstream mind. 
Finally, a note of skepticism regarding the standard trade 
theory models. If one assumes full employment and balanced trade 
and easy allocation of resources, as these CGE models do, one 
can't help but come up with beneficial results. The favorable 
results in essence have been built into the models. "Assumptions 
in: assumptions out." 
While acknowledging that these CGE model warnings are well-
taken, one observer argued that we nevertheless not abandon the 
modeling. The CGE studies do shape and influence the debate in a 
positive way, and certainly are more constructive than, for 
example, the "Bhagwati-Dornbusch shoot-out at the OK Corral." 
Another skeptical perspective focused on the experience of 
Canada, arguing that Canada's trade agreement with the United 
States has devastated the Canadian economy. The dislocation 
caused by the FTA has been very high. There has been a large 
increase in job losses due to permanent closing of firms that 
have gone south. Bankruptcies have risen dramatically. Canada's 
manufacturing base is being eroded, as is its social safety net. 
The majority of Canadians opposed the FTA with the U.S. and now 
oppose NAFTA. NAFTA poses a tremendous threat to the average 
Canadian worker. 
Lessons for other countries? Without adequate planning and 
preparation, going into an FTA with the U.S. is ill-advised at 
best. Unless constrained, the economic and political power of the 
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U.S. will dominate. 
Further, not all comparative advantages are equally 
advantageous, nor are they immutable. Orthodox economic theory 
offers little insight on this matter. A peoples standard of 
living depends significantly on the types of industries and the 
types of specializations. Those economies which specialize in 
lower value-added production processes (which may result from 
trade liberalization) will not likely be better off. An active 
state managing trade as part of an industrial strategy will 
produce better results than free trade based on outdated orthodox 
theories. 
The observations on the impact of the FTA on Canada provoked 
much discussion. One noted that it was easy to identify the short 
term costs, and much harder to sort out the benefits from the 
FTA, particularly in the context of the current recession in 
Canada. 
Much of the debate was framed by a comparison between Chile 
and Canada. It was observed, for example, that after 10 to 15 
years of unilateral liberalization, free trade now receives 
widespread support in Chile, even from the socialist party. 
Perhaps in 15 to 20 years, we will be hearing from the Canadian 
left in the same fashion. The costs of trade liberalization tend 
to be more immediate; the benefits more long term. 
One observer acknowledged that looking backward, Chileans 
are relatively supportive of the trade liberalization route that 
they took. Yet, at issue, are the reasons for Chile's success. 
Import liberalization had little to do with her export success, 
and more to do with a longer term domestic policy program. 
Further, Chile had very generous support from the international 
community and considerable resource rent from copper which 
facilitated the adjustment process. 
Another critical voice noted that Chile has paid a high 
price in terms of the environmental degradation that has 
occurred. Yet this has occurred, it was contended by another, 
because of inappropriate liberalization reforms (subsidization of 
gas, for example, is a wonderful recipe for degradation) that can 
be avoided. 
Finally, a reaction to the concern in Canada and elsewhere 
about the loss of sovereignty from greater integration with the 
United States. Sovereignty may also be sacrificed from 
alternative strategies and scenarios. Sovereignty losses due to 
indebtedness and the inability to pay off the debts (perhaps 
stemming in part from low export earnings) are not welcomed 
either. In fact, Mexico and Chile, the two economies in LAC which 
have liberalized the most, seem now to be the least vulnerable to 
the world recession. 
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Introduction 
Each of the five round tables of this colloquium was 
designed to address one of the themes of each of the five prior 
colloquia. In this respect, some common subjects resurfaced. Of 
particular significance, however, was the nature of the dialogue 
among the Brazilians as well as their interaction with others, 
and the unique perspectives which necessarily derive from the 
extraordinary Brazilian experience. 
Without Brazil, there is no Western Hemisphere Free Trade 
Area (WHFTA). In the context of Brazil's perceived reluctance to 
endorse some sort of integration with the United States, and 
given its troublesome macroeconomic state of affairs, a debate 
with a focus on the desirability and feasibility of a WHFTA on 
Brazilian soil proved to be quite enlightening. The significance 
was further underscored by the colloquium's location in Brazil: 
Sao Paulo represents the core of some of the most competitive 
industries in all of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). 
The colloquium in fact was co-hosted by the Federation of 
Industries of the State of Sao Paulo (FIESP) and the Brazilian 
Ministry of Foreign Relations (ITAMARATY) in conjunction with the 
IDB and ECLAC. Hence, much of the purpose of the debate was to 
address the Brazilian situation—attitudes, progress, obstacles, 
incentives—and to hear from the Brazilian private sector in 
particular. 
Themes 
What follows describes some of the salient themes that 
emerged, concentrating more heavily on the new and how they 
relate to the existing stock of ideas that have so far emanated 
from the project. In short, the overall tone of the dialogue was 
decidedly—and for some, somewhat surprisingly—upbeat, 
transparent and constructive. 
1. The Brazilian Situation 
The Brazilian situation is complex if not anomalous. On the 
one hand, there is a consensus that Brazil has only one broad 
option: it must become more competitive through greater 
integration in the world economy. This consensus is a major shift 
in attitude from relatively recent times. 
It was contended, in fact, that the depiction of Brazil as 
interested in international economic integration only during 
times of domestic economic troubles is no longer correct. There 
is a sense of no going back. We live in a new reality 
characterized by certain irreversible trends towards 
internationalization, most notably the formation of economic 
blocks. The Brazilian approach to these trends seems quite 
constructive and candid. Obstacles are to be viewed as 
challenges. Similarly, there is no shortage of confidence that 
Brazil is capable of competing globally. 
Yet, there are also no illusions that the Brazilian house 
must first be put in order, and that over the past two decades, 
Brazil has in fact been losing ground vis-a-vis its competitors. 
Fiscal reform is imperative. Inflation is a burden. The unequal 
distribution of wealth is unacceptable. The silver lining in the 
current crisis atmosphere is a strong incentive for change and 
acceptance that short term pain will need to precede the gain. 
Still, and somewhat ironically, there is little optimism that the 
crisis can be resolved in the short term. 
Part of this skepticism from the Brazilian private sector 
stems from its perception that the Brazilian state and its 
policies have put Brazil at a competitive disadvantage: higher 
taxes, higher interest rates, higher inflation. External problems 
also factor prominently into the equation, however. Here the 
issue boils down to fair access to foreign markets. While Brazil 
continues to liberalize, along with the rest of LAC, the U.S. and 
Europe continue to apply increasingly sophisticated forms of 
protection. Most of these NTBs are directed to Third World 
products. There is also a frustration that Brazil tends to be 
unfairly singled out in U.S. trade policy vis-a-vis the rest of 
LAC. 
In addition, frustrations percolate from a perceived lack of 
due credit for Brazil's progress towards trade liberalization (as 
well as its political achievements, most recently, its political 
soul-searching). Still, it is recognized that Brazil has done 
poorly in marketing its progress. 
The numbers for Brazil do in fact compare quite favorably 
with the trade liberalization process in the rest of LAC. Tariff 
peaks, ranges, and averages have decreased quite substantially. 
Average tariffs in Brazil are now at 17%, to be lowered further 
to 14% by July 1993. This is impressive not only on comparative 
terms across countries, but perhaps more so across time; just 
several years ago, the average tariff in Brazil was over 100%. In 
fact, it was contended that the speed of opening in Brazil has 
been quicker and more drastic than that in Mexico and Chile. 
2. Costs and Benefits 
Despite the frustrations, it is clear that the new reality 
also means that the United States is no longer the adversary. And 
this opens the possibility of further integration with the United 
States in the context of a WHFTA. Is it in Brazil's interest to 
do so? 
First, as regards possible benefits, all the standard 
arguments would seem to apply: greater realization of economies 
of scale, stimulation of foreign direct investment, increased 
competitiveness. A WHFTA could also provide the means for Brazil 
to "lock-in" to some of its trading partners' markets (the U.S. 
market, most importantly), as well as a means to "lock-in" to 
domestic macroeconomic reforms (a means to "facilitate political 
consistency"); the latter is particularly compelling for Brazil. 
Similarly, an FTA would help define a horizon for Brazilian 
industry, and help provide a clear agenda or road map to follow. 
One perspective held that conditions exist for a 
"developmental leap" for Brazil through participation in a WHFTA. 
The Brazilian economy has been stagnating in a sort of vicious 
circle; on one level of development and unable to make the 
qualitative leap to another. 
In fact, the concern that Brazil's industrial sector will be 
wiped out should it participate in a WHFTA, it was argued, is 
unfounded. Partly because the old model of nationalistic 
developmentalism—which was very effective in its time—was taken 
to the extreme, Brazil now has an industrial structure that is 
highly diversified and vertically integrated. Add to the picture 
that the first steps towards integration have already been taken 
in the form of unilateral liberalization as well as in the 
context of Mercosur without substantial loss to Brazil's 
industrial capacity, and one is provided with additional evidence 
that Brazil is capable of reaping sizable gains from a WHFTA. 
What might be some possible costs for Brazil in a WHFTA? 
Clearly, the prospects for trade diversion merit consideration in 
a country such as Brazil whose economic ties outside the 
hemisphere are relatively strong. Yet, there was a sense among 
some that the concern for trade diversion may be exaggerated. 
This may be attributed partly to the significant and ongoing 
gains in unilateral trade liberalization in Brazil. Hence, an FTA 
with the U.S. and healthy economic relations with the EC and 
other regions of the world, it was argued, are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. 
The key variable is whether barriers to the rest of the 
world are raised as a result of a WHFTA, and there may be 
indications (as further elaborated in the following section) that 
this will be unlikely. Perhaps a more compelling concern is that 
the EC may be more inclined to implicitly retaliate should Brazil 
link up with the United States. 
At any rate, the argument that Brazil should not commit to a 
free trade arrangement in the hemisphere because of comparatively 
low levels of trade within the region can be turned on its head. 
Where trade volumes are low,- potential for trade growth may be 
high. Intra-regional trade in the EC was certainly much lower 
prior to its formation. 
The concern over U.S. aggressive unilateralism certainly 
seems well-founded. On the other hand, a trade agreement with the 
United States may be a way to minimize this proclivity, 
particularly through a credible dispute settlement mechanism. A 
similar concern is that the U.S. will not include strategic 
sectors in the negotiations. Perhaps, though this has not been 
the case in NAFTA, it was argued. 
Some broader insights for Brazil and the hemisphere were 
derived from preliminary assessments of NAFTA. It was argued that 
the needs to make NAFTA a win-win situation can be anticipated. 
The notion, popularized by R. Perot's "sucking sounds" metaphor, 
that NAFTA represents a zero sum gain and a substantial burden to 
the U.S. economy was discounted as absurd. Nevertheless, while 
all three countries stand to gain on balance, an increase in 
inequalities within and between countries is possible. And the 
brunt of the displacements will fall on the poorer members of 
society, the agricultural sector in particular. In addition, a 
certain loss of domestic policy sovereignty is also likely. 
Moreover, it was argued that, in contrast to the EC, there 
will not be adequate supranational institutional support which 
could otherwise serve to mitigate these inequalities. The 
asymmetric nature of the arrangement goes to the heart of why 
this is so, and how NAFTA and a WHFTA fundamentally differ from 
the EC. 
Similarly, adjustment costs stemming from this asymmetry 
could be substantial. The reunification of Germany may be 
illustrative in this regard. 
Nevertheless, it is important to consider the 
counterfactual. In the case of NAFTA, and particularly for Mexico 
it was argued, the consequences from a failed NAFTA would be 
disastrous. 
In some respects, Brazil might fare better than Mexico in an 
FTA with the United States. This may be due in part to higher 
trade barriers in Brazil as well as a greater proportion of 
manufactured exports to the U.S. market. At any rate, the 
potential gain for Brazil will likely be greater with an FTA with 
the U.S. than one with the rest of LAC. 
Most of the costs from trade diversion from an FTA between 
the U.S. and Brazil, it was contended, would likely accrue to 
countries outside the hemisphere, rather than other LAC 
countries. Finally, the adjustments on the U.S. labor markets 
would likely be quite small from a Brazil-U.S. FTA, particularly 
relative to the impact in Brazil. Nevertheless, the rhetoric of 
"jobs going south" is part of a distorted debate in the United 
States and must be factored into the political equation. Efforts 
are needed to instill greater accuracy into the debate. 
3. The Compatibility of a WHFTA with Other Levels of Integration 
Assessing the desirability of a regional trade arrangement 
for any country necessarily depends on the compatibility of the 
regional agreement with other forms of trade liberalization. In 
this vein, discussions focused on possible inter-relations 
between a WHFTA and sub-regional integration efforts, and between 
regionalism in this hemisphere with multilateralism. 
Central towards an understanding of these dynamics is the 
realization that the hemispheric integration efforts today are 
radically different from those of the past which in fact viewed 
trade diversion as a primary objective. The implications from 
this distinction may be quite profound. For starters, it would be 
a mistake to historically extrapolate from the failed efforts of 
yesterday. 
Similarly, the competitive integration in the hemisphere 
that we see today is much more capable of being compatible with 
other levels of integration. In particular, this version of 
regionalism can coincide with and perhaps even encourage 
multilateralism. At the least, the hemispheric trade agreements 
are broadly consistent with GATT principles. With the United 
States in the game thus raising the stakes, it may be more likely 
that regionalism will even catalyse multilateralism. 
The importance of finishing the Uruguay Round cannot be 
sufficiently underscored. It is arguably a top priority, 
particularly for "global traders" such as Brazil and the United 
States. Yet even assuming that the Uruguay Round is successfully 
completed soon, what lies ahead for the GATT? Will there be 
another Round after several years pass? What will be its agenda 
and how long will it last? To the extent that one can extrapolate 
on this score, the answers may indicate that Rounds as we have 
known them may have outlived their usefulness. At a minimum, open 
regionalism, can facilitate the increasingly complex process of 
global economic integration. 
Much debate centered on the process of sub-regional 
integration in the hemisphere and how it may inter-relate with a 
more encompassing WHFTA. While not unanimous, most felt that 
establishing some sort of coherence to the web of 22 or so sub-
regional agreements should be a central objective. Some expressed 
concern that there lacks a structure or a clear direction on how 
these agreements may coalesce. Along these lines, it seems 
credible that the prospects of an FTA with the U.S. or docking to 
NAFTA could encourage a breakdown of some sub-regional 
arrangements. Some countries are ready to go faster than others. 
What will happen to Mercosur, for example, should Argentina 
pursue—and be invited to join—NAFTA? 
A more optimistic perspective held that, in light of the 
competitive arrangements, the web can be linked in a consistent 
fashion without a master plan. A process of accretion is 
conceivable. Little by little coherence will likely be attained. 
4. The Negotiating Issues 
Part of the colloquium was devoted to an examination of the 
nuts and bolts of the trade negotiating issues. It is here where 
one gets a feel for how much freer trade might be under the 
banner of an FTA. Assuming that freer trade is the objective, the 
story is not always so encouraging. 
Rules of origin (RO) is perhaps the premier example of how 
the rules of the game can be used to obstruct free trade. By 
definition a necessity in any FTA, RO nevertheless open the door 
to abuse. No method of calculating origin is without problems. 
And the number of ROs in recent FTAs is mind boggling. By one 
count, the Canada-U.S. FTA (CUSFTA) contains 1,498 separate RO. 
Extrapolating by page numbers, one arrives at an excess of 11,000 
separate RO in NAFTA. These problems and this complexity provide 
opportunities for companies to impede liberalization and risks to 
governments trying to achieve greater trade. Examples—from 
ketchup paste to electronics—can be found in NAFTA of rules 
being tailored to special protectionist interests. 
Once again, the importance of safeguards was underscored. 
The argument in support of such measures is largely political 
rather than economic. Without safety valves, the political 
feasibility of any trade agreement is seriously undermined. 
Further, while genuine safeguards which facilitate adjustment 
remain elusive in practice, continued pursuit of their 
implementation is merited in light of the alternatives. 
One such alternative is the contentious U.S. "301" laws. 
Judging from NAFTA and the U.S. trade policy process in general, 
it was argued that we can expect that the "301" laws will not go 
away as a result of any trade negotiations. What an FTA with the 
U.S. can do, however, is help tighten up the rules and help 
reduce the need for 301 in the future. The primary vehicle here 
is dispute settlement (DS). 
As was true in all prior colloquia, devising an effective DS 
mechanism emerged in the talks as a top priority. And there seems 
to be reason for optimism in this regard. First, it was observed 
that mutual interests exist for such a mechanism. For both sides, 
DS is helpful in resisting domestic political pressures for 
protection. There is also a mutual interest in transparency and 
setting out clear rules. For the LAC countries, there is a 
further interest in having a mechanism that might lessen the 
tendency for the stronger party to dominate. 
Second, there might be at least a basis for a sort of 
prototype to follow as set out in Chapter 19 of CUSFTA and now 
extended to NAFTA as well. Initial assessments of this binding 
multinational review of domestic law of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty action is very positive. It is also not 
without problems, which seem to evolve around the limited scope 
and authority of the panels, or conversely, the sometimes 
effective intrusiveness of the U.S. Congress with the help of the 
USTR and the U.S. Commerce Department. Political and arbitrary 
elements, in short, still remain. 
Intellectual property rights (IPR) emerged as a 
controversial issue once again. One perspective saw strict IPR as 
obstacles to national industrial development in LAC. A second 
perspective viewed the absence of IPR in Brazil and elsewhere in 
LAC as a considerable disability for domestic firms to compete: 
technology lost to international competitors, rampant predatory 
hiring, and absence of incentives for research within firms and 
universities. 
As regards the role of U.S. labor, a certain contradiction 
in conventional thought was highlighted. On the one hand, the 
American worker and his/her union is often chastised for being an 
obstacle to greater trade liberalization. Part of labor's 
concerns stem from predictions that NAFTA will result in lower 
wages for the American worker. Yet, it was argued, lower wages in 
the U.S. should be a concern for LAC as well, since these workers 
are also the consumers of the market that LAC countries hope to 
gain access to. Export promotion via suppression of wages is in 
no one's long term interest and at any level of development. 
If there is a culprit in the story, look at the role of the 
multinational corporations and how they continue to shape the 
international policy and undermine the sovereignty of nation 
states. In this context, the need for supranational mechanisms is 
readily apparent, 
5. The Role of Trade Liberalization, Complementary Policies, and 
the State 
Trade liberalization in any form needs to be viewed as a 
necessary though not sufficient condition for development. The 
welfare effects from trade liberalization by itself are small and 
can even be negative in certain circumstances. However, if 
combined with other appropriate measures, the gains can be 
substantial. Synergism is possible. 
Trade liberalization is also a means to an end. For Brazil, 
as perhaps for any country, internal development is the central 
theme. Integration with liberalization must not jeopardize the 
growth of internal markets and the welfare of the people. 
What are some of the appropriate measures needed to maximise 
chances that the desired end accrues? Two types of policies were 
emphasized during the colloquium. First, infrastructure 
development is a key: physical and human. Inadequate physical 
infrastructures in LAC are a drag on competition, and cause 
inefficient distortions. Ground transportation in LAC, as an 
example, tends to be more expensive than air transportation. 
Human capital must be upgraded in LAC as well. If anything is to 
be learned from the East Asian success stories, it is that a high 
priority on education and training works. 
The second type of complementary policies is more immediate. 
Trade liberalization cannot be sustained if the macroeconomic 
situation is not brought and kept under control. Macro stability 
is necessary for an individual country to reap the gains from 
trade liberalization. It is also needed between member countries 
in the context of an integration arrangement. 
Much debate evolved around the type of desired LAC state. 
The dilemma seems to be that there are pressures and needs in 
Brazil and elsewhere for the state to shrink on the one hand. Yet 
there are also needs for a more proactive government role in the 
trade and development process; a market-friendly state that gets 
out of the business of directly producing, though one that is 
also more active in shaping dynamic comparative advantages and 
enacting social policies. 
To some observers, this translates into a small yet agile 
state. Is such an entity possible? Perhaps, though according to 
one perspective, possibly not so desirable. According to this 
view, the contemporary state in an open and stable economy by 
necessity has to be not only strong but also large. The Chilean 
state seems to fit this description on both accounts. In fact, 
measured by fiscal burden, the only LAC state that is as large as 
the OECD states is the Chilean. And the notion that Chilean 
policies are largely neutral or passive with respect to trade is 
wrong, argued another observer. 
A similar perspective noted that the conventional wisdom now 
prevalent in LAC regarding the state is yet another example of 
LAC "arriving late." While the fashion in LAC is to attack the 
state, we find growing use and acceptance of the state in the 
developed countries. True, there are some inefficiencies, and 
true, we need to reduce the state's activities in some realms. 
But, let's be realistic, and not so doctrinaire. 
6. What's Next? 
For Brazil, following through on Mercosur is the top 
priority. Mercosur conditions other developments. This is where 
Brazil is to establish some credibility. 
Two proposals were presented to help stabilize the wide 
swings in macroeconomic conditions between Argentina and Brazil. 
First, move up the time table for Brazil's unilateral trade 
liberalization. This, it was argued, would temper Brazilian 
inflation and would help address the trade imbalance with 
Argentina. Second, devise a mechanism within Mercosur of cyclical 
compensatory duties. 
What about integrating with NAFTA? Here it is more than a 
question of will on the part of Mercosur. An invitation has not 
yet been forthcoming. The relationship is a bit like two poker 
players who are unsure what the other has and what the other 
wants. 
Even in the case of NAFTA, the outlines have not been 
completely filled in. One observer likened it to a scotch and 
water of unknown proportions. The scotch we know is good. What we 
don't know is how much water will be used to dilute it. This may 
merit a go-slow, wait-and-see approach for Brazil. 
What is the likelihood of an invitation by NAFTA? As in 
previous colloquia, there were some doubts about U.S. motives to 
extend NAFTA. Yet, and again assuming that an invitation is 
desired, some basis for optimism was also provided at this 
juncture. 
First, the doubts and specifically, three reasons why the 
U.S. may not be inclined to pursue expansion of NAFTA. One, the 
gains for the U.S. from integrating with Mexico may not be 
readily extrapolated to other FTAs in the hemisphere; the concern 
over Mexican migration is a case in point. Second, Clinton will 
want to differentiate his policies from that of his predecessor. 
He might even be inclined to look toward Asia for further FTAs. 
Third, pressures from U.S. labor to abandon or at least to 
radically alter the format of FTAs may continue to grow. 
The good news (perhaps) is that mention has been made by the 
Clinton administration of bilateral FTAs with three LAC 
countries: Chile, Argentina, and Venezuela and in that order. 
While perhaps not an ideal way to proceed towards a WHFTA, such 
talk may at least be indicative that growing U.S.-LAC economic 
ties will not stop at NAFTA. 
Finally, it is important to remind ourselves that no matter 
how encouraging the policy makers and the policies may be, 
hemispheric integration is not a top to bottom process. It cannot 
be dictated from above. Rather, the first step constitutes the 
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1. Introduction 
The conference was structured to address the major issues 
contained in the project's agenda, starting with considerations 
of Western Hemisphere regionalism in the context of the global 
economy, followed by intra-hemispheric economic relations between 
the U.S. and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). What are the 
roles of sub-regional arrangements and certain key individual 
countries in the hemispheric integration process? What might be 
some repercussions on these two levels from greater integration? 
Modeling the effects of hemispheric integration was 
discussed at length, followed by critical negotiating issue 
concerns. Finally, important aspects on the transition towards a 
Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area (WHFTA) and policies designed 
to accompany trade liberalization were analyzed. 
Two general observations regarding the overall tone of the 
debate merit mention. First, the diversity of perspectives was 
perhaps as great in this conference as in any of the prior 
colloquia. This is to say that skepticism and caution were more 
readily apparent in this forum, tending to balance out the 
optimism and enthusiasm. The location of the conference may have 
played a role in this. The net gains from linking up with the 
United States or the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) are 
generally perceived to be less for those South American countries 
which have relatively fewer trade and investment links with North 
America than do other LAC countries. 
Among those who participated, there was a striking 
consistency regarding predictions on both the Uruguay Round and 
NAFTA. In short, the assessment has been that despite the 
difficulties experienced by the current GATT round and 
predictions of a NAFTA failure if voted on in the U.S. Congress 
today, both will likely be successfully completed within a year, 
possibly by December 1993, according to the latest predictions. 
Some of this cautious optimism seems to stem from the 
widespread belief that a successful Uruguay Round is imperative, 
and a ratified NAFTA an important step forward. This common view, 
however, is perhaps also fueled by the widespread recognition 
that failure on both trade fronts would be disastrous. 
Rationality presumably will prevail. 
2. Regionalism and Multilateralism 
Four central messages emerged. One, regionalism in principle 
can be compatible with multilateralism. Two, emerging integration 
trends in this hemisphere on balance seem to complement 
multilateralism. Three, open integration in this hemisphere may 
not be enough to avert a conflict between the two global 
dynamics. Four, such conflict nevertheless is not a foregone 
conclusion. 
Regional integration, at least in theory, can serve as a 
catalyst towards a more liberalized and integrated world economy. 
By acting as a laboratory to resolve the problems that remain in 
the GATT, and by serving as a mechanism through which further 
integration can take place among certain countries while leaving 
the door open for others to join later, progress could be made. 
While it is true that NAFTA has emerged in large part as an 
insurance against the breakdown of the multilateral trading 
system and not as a vehicle to catalyze world trade 
liberalization, it could end up serving this latter function. 
The GATT accommodates regionalism in its Article XXIV, and it has 
often been implied that the open integration trends in the 
Western Hemisphere seem to be broadly consistent with the 
Article's intent (the rules of origin in NAFTA notwithstanding). 
Of course, in the short term, there is little doubt that 
tradeoffs are involved. The opportunity cost of focusing on one 
option leads to the neglect of the other. The reality is that 
the bureaucratic attention span is limited, and negotiating 
resources are finite. 
Of greater and more sobering significance, however, may be 
the role of countries outside the hemisphere. In fact, 
developments outside of the hemisphere may more readily dictate 
the course of events. In particular, the Europe Community (EC), 
it was argued, shows every sign of conducting a closed bloc. Not 
even the Eastern European countries have been able to export 
readily to the EC. The great danger is that Europe will end up 
playing a closed market game. 
This is not a foregone conclusion, however. The countries 
of this hemisphere can apply pressure to prevent a closed Europe. 
Germany may be the most accommodating in light of its global 
interests. Furthermore, the gains from the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, however modest, may contribute to avoiding a closed 
Europe. This means that the U.S. will likely need to make some 
concessions on intellectual property rights, financial services, 
and agriculture. Japan also needs to play a leadership role and 
to be reminded that a breakdown of the Uruguay Round will likely 
result in an increasingly strained bilateral relationship with 
the United States. 
The new world is not the ideal (multilateral) world, and on 
trade matters, the LAC countries are well behind Asia. This will 
be compounded, it was argued, by the strong emergence of China. 
Hopefully there will be room for everybody. Whether there is 
room depends in part on the robustness of the global economy. 
Here there was some disagreement on the forecasts and their 
interpretation. One position held that the 1990s will be a 
decade of chronic slow growth in the U.S. Further, the 
pessimistic predictions of aggregate world growth underestimate 
the problems for LAC countries, because those countries which are 
pulling up the global average, the East Asian countries, have a 
relatively low propensity to import LAC products. 
The more optimistic perspective held that the U.S. will grow 
steadily, and that the growth of the world economy will be higher 
than it has been in large part because Eastern Europe will be 
entering into the picture. Furthermore, East Asian countries 
have been able to export in a slow world growth environment. 
Small countries, including LAC countries, can do so again. 
Assuming the Uruguay Round is completed should there be 
another global forum? A Clinton Round, it was argued, would be a 
mistake. If anything, there should be a "GATT Effectiveness 
Round" which would focus on improving what has already been 
agreed upon in prior rounds rather than embarking on new 
territory. 
If Europe becomes closed, what are the options? One 
possibility would be to extend the NAFTA (or WHFTA) into a 
Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA). 
3. Hemispheric Relations 
Discussions focused on individual countries and groups of 
countries, considering their roles in the hemispheric integration 
process and how they might be affected by the changes. 
Moving from general observations to the more specific, two 
broad observations on U.S.-LAC relations emerged. One is in 
regards to the favorable evolution of U.S. attitudes vis-a-vis 
LAC. Specifically, the United States, it was observed, is no 
longer looking at the region to see what it can do LAC or even 
for LAC, but rather what it can do with LAC. 
This new attitude stems in part from the recognition of 
growing mutual interests between the U.S. and LAC. Among other 
things, this mutual interest means that LAC can play a supporting 
role towards alleviating sluggish U.S. growth. In fact this 
belief is demonstrated by the fact that U.S export growth 
increased faster to LAC than to the rest of the world. 
Second, two LAC perspectives vis-a-vis its trade relations 
with the U.S. resurfaced. The common denominator in both 
positions is a concern over the re-emergence of past U.S. habits 
vis-a-vis the region, and, perhaps more importantly, concern over 
the U.S. trend of creeping "back door" protectionism. Will an 
FTA with the U.S. actually translate into relatively free U.S. 
market access? There is also concern over the asymmetric 
negotiating strength, the conditions for membership that the U.S. 
will likely insist upon, and the possible loss of sovereignty 
that would result. 
The two LAC perspectives fundamentally differ on how one 
should address these concerns. One favors staying at arms length 
from the United States in order to gain a better picture of U.S. 
intent by watching the development of NAFTA before committing. 
The other perspective is inclined to increase interaction with 
the United States. The best way to monitor U.S. intent and to 
minimize potential problems is through ongoing dialogue and 
initiative. 
3a. Sub-regions 
Hemispheric relations hinge on NAFTA. In this regard, 
NAFTA's impact has so far been quite favorable. It has 
legitimized the sub-regional arrangements and, more generally, 
has revitalized hemispheric GATT-consistent integration. 
How might NAFTA affect the future hemispheric equation? 
Three broad scenarios were highlighted. The best case scenario, 
and perhaps the most likely, is a ratified NAFTA that is 
eventually extended to other LAC countries. A non-ratified NAFTA 
would have unthinkable consequences for Mexico in particular. 
The credibility of U.S. trade policy would be seriously impaired, 
and U.S.-LAC relations would likely suffer as well. 
However, a third scenario could be the worst from the point 
of view of LAC (with the exception of Mexico). This would be the 
case of a ratified NAFTA that is not extended. This observation 
coincides with an often-heard assertion that an important reason 
for joining a Western Hemisphere free trade area stems from the 
high costs of not joining. 
The conference dialogue focused on the most optimistic 
scenario. Even in this case, however, many concerns were raised 
regarding how best to extend NAFTA. Clearly, while NAFTA 
provides the template for integration in the hemisphere, it does 
not provide the answers as to how the hemisphere can best 
coalesce into something akin to a WHFTA. 
# Many participants expressed concern about the possible divisiveness that NAFTA expansion could have on existing sub-
regional arrangements. One-by-one country additions to NAFTA may 
be the most feasible, though the most likely to inflict harm on 
the sub-regions. Some countries will be ready to accede sooner, 
and those which are ready should not be held back by those who 
are not. How can extending NAFTA occur with minimum harm to sub-
regional arrangements? 
Perhaps a "concentric circles" arrangement could be 
fashioned which would explicitly recognize the diversity among 
LAC countries in levels of development, economic stability, and 
ability to meet commitments. This could entail different rules-
and different degrees of commitment for the various participants: 
full membership into NAFTA with complete reciprocity for some, 
such as Chile, and association with preferential schemes for 
others, such as the CBI countries. Still, it is hard to envision 
how some sub-regional arrangements would not become casualties in 
the process of moving towards a WHFTA. 
3b. Individual Countries 
Heterogeneity characterizes the countries of the hemisphere. 
The most important distinctions from the standpoint of 
hemispheric integration include differences in economic size, 
level of development, and the nature of economic ties with the 
United States in particular. This diversity implies a large 
variance in country roles towards a possible WHFTA, as well as 
significant differences in how a WHFTA could affect individual 
countries. 
The United States of course holds the key. A constant 
concern continues to be that the U.S. will not be sufficiently 
motivated to extend NAFTA to the rest of the hemisphere, though 
the official word is that the extension will be pursued once 
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round are completed. Nevertheless, U.S. 
trade relations with LAC are less important than domestic 
considerations and trade relations with Asia and Europe. This 
seems to suggest that LAC initiative will be critical. 
At any rate, what is needed from the U.S., it was argued, is 
the articulation of a framework for hemispheric integration. An 
explicit recognition of the diversity in the hemisphere, ideally 
would evolve into the development of a menu of options to 
accommodate this diversity. 
As the only country of the hemisphere to have successfully 
completed an FTA with the U.S., Canada offers some critical 
lessons. First, an FTA with the U.S. can represent a bargaining 
forum through which problems can be resolved and tensions 
minimized. This is not to say that U.S. protectionism towards 
FTA members will disappear, but the U.S. is not a monolith. With 
Mexico on board working towards decreasing trade barriers, 
Canada's situation will be made easier. The more countries that 
follow, the easier it becomes. 
NAFTA in fact represents an improvement over CUSFTA from the 
Canadian standpoint, it was argued. There has been an advance in 
rule making which is fundamental for Canada. In addition, it was 
felt that NAFTA has contributed more to Mexican-Canadian 
relations than anything in the prior 50 years. 
Second, social sustainability aspects must be explicitly 
addressed. This entails both adjustment costs as well as longer 
term considerations, such as migration, education, and quality of 
life. There is a need for an open dialogue, an acknowledgement 
that there will be inevitable costs, and a need for policies to 
minimize those costs. 
There is a third lesson which follows from the second. Don't 
oversell free trade, and don't get too ideological in the 
process. In Canada, there was not a proper dialogue on social 
sustainability. The CUSFTA agreement was oversold, and now Canada 
is dealing with severe adjustment costs in the context of 
exaggerated expectations. 
Fourth, keep your options open. The new conditionalities are 
very much a threat—political, human rights, and environmental 
NTBs on the horizon. This is a game for the long term, and one 
that requires a multi-track strategy. 
Mexico is in the unique and ambiguous position of being the 
only LAC country member of NAFTA. How Mexico relates to its LAC 
neighbors will be an important ingredient in the feasibility and 
desirability of a wider FTA. 
Concerns were raised that Mexico's interest might not 
readily coincide with those of the rest of LAC. There may, for 
example, be an inclination on Mexico's part to try to limit 
further membership in NAFTA, since such expansion would tend to 
dilute Mexico's preferential arrangement with the U.S. and 
Canada. It may in fact be in Mexico's interest to establish 
bilateral FTAs with other LAC countries independent of NAFTA as 
NAFTA deepens. This could establish Mexico as a hub in the 
hemispheric integration process. 
Two distinct positions were voiced with regards to the 
interests of Brazil in a WHFTA. One stance, perhaps closer to the 
official Brazilian position, was skeptical and cautious. First, 
it is very difficult to quantify a priori the gains and losses 
from an FTA with the U.S. for any LAC country. It was asked how 
beneficial such a strategy would be for Brazil given its position 
as a global trader. Second, Brazil is very different from Mexico 
and that these differences would likely imply fewer gains and 
higher costs for Brazil. Fewer gains in part because market 
access for Brazil's more industrialized products will likely be 
less than for Mexico's exports; higher costs in part because 
trade and investment diversion would likely be greater and 
adjustment costs more severe. 
It is also hard to conceive of how Brazil could proceed in 
the near term towards a trade pact with the U.S. without 
jeopardizing Mercosur. In addition, Mexico's macroeconomic 
stabilization has been a success; in Brazil this has not been the 
case. It is true that much has happened in terms of trade 
liberalization in Brazil, and with regards to Brazil's improved 
relations with the U.S., particularly on the multilateral level. 
There is always a danger, however, that tensions with the U.S. 
will return, and it is likely that the economic instability in 
Brazil will remain for some time. Perhaps Brazil would be better 
served if it focused on getting its domestic house in order while 
keeping its foreign trade options open by continuing to pursue a 
multilateral strategy. 
Another Brazilian viewpoint argued that even though 
multilateralism may be more important to Brazil than it is to 
Mexico, Brazil cannot bring about multilateralism any more than 
the U.S. can. Nor can Brazil afford to be marginalized. Further, 
the argument that Brazil is not ready to pursue a WHFTA because 
of its macroeconomic instability does not hold. A commitment to a 
WHFTA would likely expedite stabilization. Brazil can compete. It 
is in the national interest, even if it's not the national 
position, that Brazil take some initiative on this matter. 
Assuming Brazil is interested, when would it be best for 
Brazil to join NAFTA? A non-Brazilian perspective felt quite 
adamantly that Brazil should be the last LAC country in line, in 
part because of the political problems that could arise as a 
result of high adjustment costs in the U.S. after Brazil's 
accession to the NAFTA. Many U.S. jobs would be lost during the 
adjustment period, it was argued. 
In direct contrast, a proposal put forth during the 
project's second colloquium claimed that Brazil should be next in 
line. Such a strategy, it was argued, would actually bring 
political support and perhaps a greater commitment on the part of 
the U.S., due to the relatively sizable gains for U.S. producers 
from tapping into the Brazilian market. It would also make it 
much more difficult for other LAC countries to remain outside. 
Even so, it is widely recognized that Chile will be the 
first LAC country to accede to NAFTA. In contrast to Brazil, the 
official position in Chile is one that is very enthusiastic about 
such a prospect. Nevertheless, the Chilean positions presented 
at the conference were much more reserved. The two major 
hemispheric integration options for Chile are an FTA with the 
U.S. and an arrangement with Mercosur. 
An FTA with the U.S. could mean significant trade diversion 
for a country like Chile which is relatively diversified in its 
trading partners. For Mexico, in contrast, an FTA with the U.S. 
is almost equivalent to unilateral opening. 
It is probably true that Chile may be assured better access 
to the U.S. market than would Brazil because Chilean exports are 
mainly primary products. On the other hand, an FTA with the 
U.S., it was argued, may do little to help Chile diversify its 
exports into more processed goods. There is also concern that the 
side agreements of NAFTA may dilute the benefits to Chile should 
it join NAFTA. 
Mercosur may be more of a natural outlet for Chile's 
industrial products, although in principle Chile has preferred to 
sign agreements with Venezuela and Mexico. In addition, 
Mercosur's trade barriers are relatively higher than those in 
NAFTA, and the macroeconomic instability of some of Mercosur's 
members remains a concern. Perhaps the best option for Chile 
would be to join NAFTA while also entering into an FTA with 
Mercosur, thus maintaining its trade independence and obtaining 
some assurances of stable and diversified market access. 
Finally, there seems to be a growing consensus that the 
smallest countries of the hemisphere, and those which have strong 
economic ties to North America—that is, the Caribbean and 
Central American countries —will need to be included into the 
hemispheric integration formula in some fashion. The costs of 
exclusion from "NAFTA plus" would be devastating for these 
countries. Nor would such costs stop at the borders. It is also 
in the interest of the U.S. that its poorer neighbors be brought 
into the development program. Finally, the political costs of 
the inclusion of these relatively small economies would likely be 
quite small for the NAFTA members. 
Some of the differences in country perspectives, it was 
argued, can be attributed to the many uncertainties regarding 
NAFTA that confront LAC countries. If one could be assured that 
NAFTA and its extension would truly represent free trade, stable 
market access, and lower barriers to nonmembers, then many of the 
differences in perspectives would be minimized. The hemisphere 
needs a clearer view of the rules of the game. 
4. Models 
Most of the discussion focused on computable general 
equilibrium models (CGEs) of Western Hemisphere integration. What 
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purpose do they serve? What are some criticisms of the models? 
What are some of the findings? 
Results of the CGE models for NAFTA have shown that, in the 
aggregate, all three countries stand to gain, though the effects 
will be much more substantial for Mexico. When one disaggregates 
some and begins to look at the distributional effects, one finds 
some results that may appear to be counter-intuitive, and 
contrary to conventional wisdom. In particular, the models' 
results dispute the assertion that the unskilled blue collar 
worker in the U.S. will be a primary loser from NAFTA. Where the 
greatest detrimental impact may occur, in fact, is in the 
agricultural sector in both the U.S. and Mexico. 
These distributional findings highlight one of the merits of 
CGE modeling, it was argued. The models enable us to discover the 
links or the channels through which results are obtained, and can 
help us make sense of seemingly counter-intuitive results. 
Take the case of the effects of trade liberalization on the 
unskilled laborer in the United States. The Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem tells us that trade liberalization will adversely affect 
the scarce factor. This means that in the U.S., unskilled labor 
should lose, and wages in these jobs should fall. Yet the models 
show influences which tend to offset any downward pressures on 
wages for unskilled labor in the United States. One salient 
influence is that of economies of scale which are realized not 
just in the export sector but also in the import-competing firms, 
where the scarce factor is used intensively. 
CGE modeling hence lets us perceive complex 
interdependencies. With such models, we have the capacity to go 
beyond trade liberalization to assess deeper integration, 
important areas of labor, investment, and the environment. In 
terms of their application to NAFTA and beyond, the models thus 
let us get at the asymmetric nature of the integration process, 
and to identify policy options. In light of the trends towards 
deeper regional integration, CGE models, it was argued, will only 
increase in importance as an analytical tool. 
What are some of the criticisms? Fundamentally, results can 
be quite arbitrary and are susceptible to unrealistic 
assumptions, such as the equilibrium of exchange rates. 
Favorable results tend to be built into the models through 
unrealistic initial conditions. Furthermore, while the models 
may capture some complex interdependencies, there is much that 
eludes quantification. How does one model "animal spirits?" 
Hence there is a need for independent empirical verification. 
Marginal changes in an initial condition, it was argued, can 
make major changes in results, and only the builders of the model 
knows what drives it. In other words, CGE models are not user 
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friendly. 
Finally, there is no temporal dimension to these models. 
There is no transition period from one "equilibrium" to another, 
and hence no adequate estimation of adjustment costs. There is no 
allowance for the possibility that a costly adjustment period 
could set in motion a less favorable development path. 
In general, and the criticisms notwithstanding, there was a 
sense that the models have an important supportive role to play. 
However, it was observed that we must not underestimate the 
importance of our general knowledge on the subject which can 
serve as a basis for broad action. We know, for example, that 
those economies which have integrated into the world economy have 
done better than those which have not. 
Two alternative (non CGE) models of North-South integration 
focusing on capital flows were presented. The "traditional" 
model is one that depicts a positive sum gain for both sides. 
The Northern economies are Keynesian (that is, demand driven); 
the Southern economies are characterized by supply-side 
constraints. The North benefits from a trade surplus with the 
South. The South sustains trade deficits with Northern capital. 
Wages rise in the North. Job creation occurs in the South. 
Such a model, it was argued, may not be as applicable today 
as in the past, in part due to the changing nature of capital 
flows. This is exemplified by the increasingly relevant scenario 
of capital flowing to the South in the form of relocated foreign 
direct investment. Ultimately, this capital flow could undermine 
the Northern economies' ability to compete, and trade surpluses 
in the North could turn into trade deficits in the longer term. 
In addition, these investment flows could exacerbate regressive 
income distribution trends in the North which in turn would 
adversely affect aggregate demand. The reduction in demand in the 
North (and with it perhaps market access) in turn could undermine 
one of the main potential attractions of a North-South FTA from 
the South's perspective. 
5. Negotiation issues 
Deepening integration is the name of the game, and rule 
making is the most important aspect of trade negotiations. 
The liberalization of services is, like liberalization in 
goods, welfare enhancing. The strengthening of intellectual 
property rights, in contrast, is not necessarily welfare 
improving. 
Emergency safeguards must play a critical role in supporting 
tariff phase-outs and, in general, in facilitating the transition 
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during trade liberalization. The liberalization process in the 
context of an FTA is a bit like a trip down the Niagara Falls. 
The waters before and after the falls are calm. It is the 
transition that we need to worry about. 
Antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) actions will 
continue in any FTA with the United States. The qualified good 
news is that something akin to Chapter 19 on dispute settlement 
of the CUSFTA has been adopted in NAFTA. With such a mechanism, 
all parties will have equal and consistent review of each trading 
partner's AD and CVD actions. As with Mexico, however, this 
mechanism will likely imply some changes in domestic laws and 
standards in LAC countries which join an FTA with the United 
States. 
Rules of origin (RO) are necessary in any regional FTA, 
though they are not necessarily liberalizing. The devil is in the 
details and there is no shortage of details in the NAFTA text on 
ROs. There may be up to 11,000 ROs in the NAFTA text, many of 
which seem to accommodate more parochial interests, often serving 
to encourage trade diversion over trade creation. 
The interface between environmental issues and trade is 
multi-faceted, short on adequate study, and subject to a great 
deal of misunderstandings and controversy. The consensus of 
existing studies tells us that differences in environmental 
standards have a modest impact on trade patterns. This would seem 
to suggest that the case for harmonization may not be very 
compelling. 
This is not to imply, however, that upgrading environmental 
standards in a LAC country would not be welfare enhancing for 
that country. Environmental degradation is a welfare distorting 
externality at any level of development. Keeping the environment 
on the negotiating table can be in the interests of all. On the 
other hand, attempting to harmonize too much, too soon, may not 
be in any member country's interest. At any rate, the intensity 
of the debate in NAFTA has been a function in part of a certain 
uniqueness of the situation—a country bordering the U.S.—and is 
not likely to be replicated in an extension of NAFTA. 
6. Sequencing and Hemispheric Integration 
To what extent can issues of trade liberalization and FTAs 
be separated from domestic macroeconomic conditions and cross-
country macroeconomic coordination? Can trade liberalization come 
first, and macro coordination or even macro stability come later? 
One perspective argued yes. In essence, it was an argument 
expressing preference for hemispheric FTAs over deeper forms of 
integration, in part because the former presumably is more 
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feasible. An FTA, it was argued, has clear advantages in 
implementation over a common market because a trade agreement 
does not need macro coordination to accrue benefits. In 
particular, trade and monetary integration can be pursued 
separately, and trade should come first. This is particularly 
important in the context of hemispheric asymmetry. 
There are lessons to be learned from Europe, it was 
contended. Free trade within the EC began despite a lack of 
fiscal and exchange rate coordination. The simple objectives of 
shallow integration, at least at first, are much more 
constructive than trying to be overly ambitious. 
Other participants felt differently. Trade and 
macroeconomics can be separated in principle, though not in 
practice. Today, the "beef" is beyond the border, shallow 
integration. We need to have progress on the deep integration 
issues, and to do so, one cannot separate trade from 
macroeconomic issues such as exchange rates. 
Perhaps the distinction between macroeconomic coordination 
and macroeconomic stability helps clear the debate. Broad macro 
stability is sufficient. Macro coordination invites trouble. 
Another sequencing question is how does political 
liberalization interact with trade liberalization, and is there 
an optimal sequence in this interaction? Three scenarios exist 
in the hemisphere. The optimal scenario, it was argued, is the 
case of Chile. Here trade liberalization occurred first, and 
political liberalization ensued. Second, a "not too unfavorable" 
scenario is the case of Venezuela where the sequence has been 
reversed. 
The third scenario is simultaneous political and trade 
liberalization. This is what most of LAC is currently doing. In 
theory at any rate, it is also potentially the worst case 
scenario. Simultaneous liberalization enables the mobilization of 
the adversely hit sectors and hence with it, possible blockage or 
even overturn of one liberalization or the other. What is 
comforting is that this blockage is not happening. Simultaneous 
liberalization has so far been rather stable for LAC. 
Nevertheless, institutional reforms of the political system 
in LAC may be needed to minimize possible problems along these 
lines. Recommended reforms include a greater emphasis on the 
parliamentary system, more effort towards eradicating gridlock 
between executive and legislative branches of government, and a 
greater and more independent voice for the judiciary. 
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This was the second and final conference for the project. As 
with the first conference, this forum served as a means to 
address the salient issues covered over the duration of the 
project. We briefly review these issues below. 
NAFTA 
The November 17 vote in the U.S. Congress looms and 
uncertainties were expressed as to the outcome. Consensus 
obtained on the importance of passing NAFTA and on the 
distortions of the debate in the United States. NAFTA's merits 
draw from the anticipated benefits in the aggregate to the three 
member countries, but are not limited to these benefits. NAFTA 
has very important repercussions for the whole hemisphere and 
even beyond. The public debate within the U.S. all too often has 
been much too narrowly focused on jobs and economics. 
Furthermore, many of the contentions of its critics can be turned 
on their head: NAFTA is more likely to be part of the solution to 
their concerns than part of the problem. 
In addition, there is more to the story than the gains from 
passage of NAFTA. In particular, failure of NAFTA could set in 
motion some highly deleterious consequences. Perhaps the most 
pessimistic scenario voiced at the conference was the following: 
failure of NAFTA would trigger a failure at the Uruguay Round. 
The markets will view the situation as such on November 17 in the 
event that NAFTA is voted down, and hence both the Mexican and 
U.S. stock markets will crash. Mexico will also immediately 
devalue its currency under the cover that it is the U.S. to 
blame. 
Transition to a WHFTA and the Role of Subregions 
Hemispheric-wide integration remains either a dream (in the 
form of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative) or at best is 
very weak (ALADI). Hence it is important that one priority over 
the coming decade be that the integrity of the subregional 
arrangements remain intact. This will be highly challenging as 
hemispheric integration forces are also likely to pull on the 
subregional fabric. This will particularly be so if countries 
begin to access to NAFTA one at a time, and if countries continue 
to sign trade agreements with more than one group of countries. 
In this vein, one position advocated that countries not be 
allowed to join more than one sub-regional integration 
arrangement. 
Some discussion emerged over the issues of deepening the 
integration process and its relation to widening the process. It 
was argued that both could occur, though consideration of 
sequencing may be merited. One perspective held that deepening 
among the subregions might very well be the priority; in essence, 
if regionalism and subregionalism is to be made worthwhile, then 
the process must be more than merely reducing trade barriers at 
the borders. 
Domestic Preparation and National Strategies 
While diversity prevails among the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC) on many fronts, one important 
aspect of this diversity is the degree to which countries are 
ready to engage in an FTA with the countries of NAFTA. Chile may 
be one extreme; Brazil the other. Still, with the exception of 
Chile and possibly one or two others, there is much that can be 
done and needs to be done on a domestic level throughout LAC. 
This includes a fairly familiar package of policy 
prescriptions to ensure stabilization and to maximize economic 
growth and includes: reducing inflation in large part through the 
reduction of fiscal deficits; maintaining realistic real exchange 
rates; unilateral trade liberalization; and privatization. Longer 
term considerations need to include a focus on investments in 
physical and human capital; the latter important for increasing 
competitiveness and growth as well as for addressing the gross 
disparities in the region's distribution of income and wealth. 
Modeling the Effects of a WHFTA 
Preliminary results from two CGE modeling efforts on the 
effects of hemisphere-wide FTAs were provided. Some of the 
findings included the following: (1) the gains from an FTA with 
NAFTA countries for other LAC countries tend to be positive in 
the aggregate albeit relatively small; (2) returns to both 
capital and labor tend to increase with an FTA, contrary to the 
Samuelson-Stolper theorem, and the case of Chile notwithstanding; 
(3) disaggregating the effects of freer trade by sector reveals a 
widespread diversity of the effects by sector; (4) NAFTA seems to 
be by and large trade creating, and will likely benefit all three 
member countries (and the sucking sounds metaphor of employment 
and firms moving south is off base); (5) there is not likely to 
be any significant migration from Mexico to the U.S. in the short 
run due to NAFTA; over the longer term, NAFTA is likely to 
contribute to the alleviation of such flows. 
Negotiating Issues 
The problems inherent in rules of origin in any FTA point to 
the importance of simultaneously focusing on multilateral trade 
liberalization at the GATT. Rules of origin tend to be a "happy 
hunting ground" for special interests and hence provide a vehicle 
for trade protectionism through the back door. 
There is a need for finding the strongest dispute settlement 
possible while at the same time protecting sovereignty. One 
perspective argued that the evolution of the U.S. trade 
agreements—from the Israel-U.S. FTA, to CÜSFTA, to NAFTA—is 
characterized by growing complexity and inflexibility, and that 
these traits are reflected in the evolution of the dispute 
settlement measures. 
Problems in anti-dumping and countervailing duties are 
likely to continue in the presence of a NAFTA and a wider WHFTA. 
Consensus in both areas continues to elude trade negotiators in 
all trade forums; in essence, progress has amounted to an 
agreement to agree on the need for improvements. The lack of 
progress is due in part to the inability to even agree on the 
purpose of these regimes as well as difficulties inherent in the 
implementation of such regimes. 
As regards environmental issues, it was argued that NAFTA is 
a blueprint, but more than that, a "living document." In this 
respect, and from the perspective of at least some of the 
environmental community, NAFTA is just the beginning of a 
fruitful dialogue on the interface between trade and the environment. 
Western Hemisphere Regionalism in the World Economy 
Open regionalism need not be an oxymoron. The impact of 
regional trade agreements on the world economy is dependent on 
how these trade pacts are done. And there are indications that 
the sub-regional agreements in the Western Hemisphere—NAFTA the 
most significant in terms of economic size and impact—are 
emerging as relatively compatible with a liberalized world 
trading system. It is important that trade liberalization proceed 
simultaneously on three fronts: unilaterally, regionally, and 
multilaterally. 
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